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Summary findinigs
The Uruguay Round agreements established the World  environmental issues will provide excuses to increase
Trade  Organization (WTO), overhauled and  barriers on their exports. They all oppose WTO
strengthened the GATT rules oni  trade in goods, and  discussion of labor standards. They are divided about
added rules on trade in services and intellectual property.  whether to reach an agreement on investment but tend
Individual countries made wide-ranging commitments to  to favor seeking an agreement on competition issues.
liberalize trade policies.  Developing countries'  attitudes toward further WTO
A new round of multilateral trade negotiatons may be  negotiations are divided; they tend to be negative, but
launched in the year 2000 or soon after. Croome reviews  may be shifting toward support.
the probable agenda for these negotiations and reactions  Small and underdeveloped  countries are unenthusiastic
thereto.  because they cannot participate effectively in
Agriculture is a certainty for negotiations, with  negotiations in Geneva and are distracted by upcoming
agricultural exporters insisting on liberalized markets.  negotiations with the European Union.
Net food importers  fear such reforms will increase food  Many developing countries feel their levels of
costs and endanger food security.  commitment are already heavy, they need more time to
Trade in services is certain to be on the agenda, but  absorb the consequences of their commitments, and it
some developing countries see little to gain in this area,  would be counterproductive to rush into another round
unless their workers gain opportunities to provide  of negotiations. They argue that industrial countries have
services in other countries  yet to deliver on liberalization important  to their trade.
Many developing countries could benefit from further  Countries that favor negotiations favor a broad agenda
negotiations on tariffs.  for negotiations because they have relatively wide trade
Developing countries are determined to avoid opening  interests, best served by a single negotiation that offers
up the Uruguay Round agreement on textiles and  something for all participants and allows tradeoffs.
clothing. They also fear that any WTO agreement on
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Summary  Findings
The Uruguay Round agreements established the WTO, overhauled and strengthened the GATT rules
on trade in goods, added rules on trade in services and intellectual property, and incorporated wide-
ranging commitments by individual countries to liberalize trade policies. Developing countries, which
played a marginal role in GATT activities and escaped many of its disciplines, are with minor
exceptions fully bound by WTO rules. Although given extra time to adapt their policies and
economies to the new rules, these transition periods are now ending, except for the least-developed
countries. Many developing countries feel they need more time to meet their commitments, and argue
that developed countries have yet to deliver on liberalization important to their trade. Nevertheless,
several Uruguay Round agreements commit WTO Members to further negotiations, and many include
review provisions. WTO work on environmental, investment and competition issues could also lead to
negotiations, as could proposals by individual governments. A May 1998 decision of WTO Ministers
calls for recommendations on "further liberalization sufficiently broad-based to respond to the range
of interests and concerns of all Members, within the WTO framework". A new round - in fact, if not
in name - of multilateral trade negotiations may thus be launched in the year 2000, or soon
afterwards. The paper reviews the prospective agenda for these negotiations, and assesses the views of
developing and other WTO members on each subject, and on the desirability of a new round.
Agriculture is a certainty for negotiations. Agricultural exporters, both developing and developed, will
seek significant liberalization of markets, building on reforms agreed in the Uruguay Round. Some
developing countries which are net food importers fear that these reforms may lead to increase food
costs, and may seek assurances on security of supply. An effort is being made to find common ground
between these views. The other certainty for negotiations is trade in services. Some developing
countries see little to gain in this area, unless opportunities open up for their workers to provide
services in other countries. Further negotiations on tariffs could offer greater scope for a balance of
interests. Many countries would benefit if tariff peaks and tariff escalation in sensitive sectors such as
textiles, clothing and shoes could be reduced, along with tariffs on specific products of export interest
to them. Numerous developing countries, including some of the poorest, apply tariff rates well below
their WTO-bound levels, and could gain bargaining power in the negotiations as a whole, without
much loss of protection or revenue, if they offered reductions in bound rates. Negotiations on opening
up government procurement could also offer bargaining opportunities.
Other ingredients for a new trade round are harder to discern. Developing countries are determined to
avoid opening up the lJruguay Round agreement on textiles and clothing, which requires removal by4
January 2005 of all existing  bilateral  restrictions  on their exports  of these  products.  They  also  fear that
importing  countries  may  resort, as substitutes  for these  restrictions,  to changes  in origin rules, anti-
dumping  measures,  or measures  justified  as protecting  the environment  or labour standards  - all
further possible  subjects  for negotiations.  Although  the "built-in  agenda"  of the Uruguay  Round
agreements  calls for self-contained  reviews  of a wide range of subjects,  some  may  be included in new
negotiations  if separate  agreements  cannot  be reached,  or if the prospect  of a broader  negotiation,  with
give-and-take  between  subjects,  encourages  higher ambitions.  This  might apply  to negotiations  on
intellectual  property  issues and subsidies,  which  include  points  of interest  to developing  countries.
Developing  countries  fear that any  WTO agreement  on environmental  issues  will provide  excuses  to
increase  barriers  to their exports.  All oppose  WTO  discussion  of labour standards.  Some  share the
interest of many developed  countries  in reaching  a WTO  agreement  on investment;  others are strongly
opposed.  Developing  countries  tend to favour  seeking  an agreement  on competition  issues.
On the general desirability  of a new round  of trade negotiations,  developing-country  views  on balance
remain negative,  but may  be shifting  towards  support.  Some  countries  continue  to argue that because
the Uruguay  Round results  represent  an unprecedented  level  of commitment,  and time is needed  to
absorb  the consequences,  it would  be counterproductive  to rush into another round.  The least-
developed  and other  very small countries  are also  unenthusiastic  because  they lack the capacity  to
participate  effectively  in negotiations  in Geneva;  many  are also distracted  by coming  negotiations  with
the European  Union. Other developing  countries  see positive  aspects  to a new round. Agricultural
exporters  believe  that a broader  negotiation  could permit  constructive  trade-offs.  Others see scope  for
special  and differential  treatment  of developing  countries  (especially  in agricultural  negotiations,  but
also  more generally),  for productive  tariff  bargaining,  and also  for negotiations  on some  aspects  of
services.  Review  of WTO rules could  provide  opportunity  for correction  of what some see as inequities
affecting  developing  countries.  Those  countries  which  favour  new negotiations  do so partly  because  of
dislike  of the alternative  sectoral  approach  to liberalization,  and partly (for  differing  reasons)  because
of regional moves  towards  free trade. They  favour  a broad agenda  for negotiations  because  they have a
comparatively  wide trade interests,  best served  in the context  of a single  undertaking  that offers
something  for all participants,  and allows  trade-offs.
With such a range of concerns,  developing  countries  cannot  speak  with a single  voice in the WTO.
Some  seek, however,  to build ad hoc coalitions  on particular  subjects,  so as to present a common  front
where possible,  and to identify  issues  on which negotiations  might  yield  clear gains for developing
countries.  To the extent  that these  efforts  succeed,  developing  countries  will  be better placed  to help
define  the content  of future negotiations,  rather  than simply  reacting  to initiatives  from developed
WTO members.5
I: INTRODUCTION
This paper is intended to offer a point of departure for research on trade issues of concern to
developing countries that may be taken up in multilateral negotiations in the World Trade
Organization.  The 1994 Uruguay Round agreements established the WTO, overhauled the rules of
the multilateral trading system, and incorporated  wide-ranging commitments by individual countries
to liberalize their trade policies. Many of the agreements commit WTO members to further
negotiations, or to review of the new rules in the light of experience. This "built-in agenda"'  has been
supplemented by more recent WTO decisions to undertake additional work on specific subjects that
could also lead to negotiations. Further proposals have been floated by individual governments, and
have received  varying degrees of support. Largely by coincidence, the negotiations foreseen under the
built-in agenda, as well as many of the scheduled reviews,  must begin in or around the year 2000.
This inevitably suggested that these negotiations might be brought together as a single undertaking,
comparable  with past negotiating rounds in the WTO's predecessor,  the GATT.  The likelihood that
this will in fact happen has recently increased. A meeting of WTO Ministers in May 1998 agreed that
officials should draw up recommendations for a work programme, based on the built-in agenda and
later decisions, as well as on possible additional proposals by member governments. A further meeting
of Ministers, probably in late 1999,  will pass judgement on the recommendations,  which are to
include "further liberalization sufficiently  broad-based  to respond to the range of interests and
concerns of all Members, within the WTO framework".'
The main body of the paper reviews, for each potential negotiating subject, the commitments to future
work undertaken by WTO members, the work already under way, and the main strands of thinking on
the subject among the principal trading countries and developing countries. This subject-by-subject
survey  takes up, first, agriculture and services, the two subjects on which there is a firm commitment
to undertake new negotiations. It then looks at other subjects  already covered by WTO agreements.
Many of these are covered  by review provisions which could lead to further negotiations, and all are
accepted as legitimate matters for consideration in the context of the WTO. As a third category, the
paper considers subjects which, although not covered by existing obligations, are by agreement now
under study in the WTO.  A fourth group consists of a single subject -labour standards--which a few
countries would like the WTO to take up.  The paper concludes  with a brief discussion of prospects for
a new general round of multilateral trade negotiations.
' For a useful recent compilation of the elements of the "built-in agenda", with accompanying notes
on work undertaken so far, see the WTO Secretariat's note Implementation of the Provisions  for
Review, Future Work  or Negotiations in the WTO  Agreement and Related Decisions and Declarations
of 7 May 1998 (WTO document WTIL/27  1).6
The paper takes account of developments  up to July 1998,  notably  including the meeting of the
WTO's governing Ministerial Conference  in Geneva in May 1998.
The assistance is gratefully  acknowledged  of the representatives  of developing  and developed
countries, both in Geneva and Brussels, who found time to talk off  the record about their countries'
trade concerns and to give their own assessment  of present and prospective  developments  at the WTO.
I have quoted some of their views, anonymously;  those views which are attributed were stated
publicly, in various contexts. I am also grateful for helpful comments on an earlier draft from a
number of friends and colleagues  and an anonymous  reviewer.
2 Ministerial Declaration approved  at the end of the Second Session  of the WTO Ministerial
Conference,  Geneva, 20 May 1998.7
II: POSSIBLE SUBJECTS FOR WTO NEGOTIATIONS
(a) Subjects already scheduled  for negotiation
Among the 28 substantive  Uruguay  Round agreements,  many contain provisions  which require that
they undergo general review some  years after their entry into force. Any such review could lead to
negotiations on the subject concerned. Two agreements,  however,  go further. The Agreement on
Agriculture and the General Agreement on Services  (GATS)  call specifically  for negotiations  to carry
forward the process of liberalization  embarked upon in the Uruguay  Round. Because the negotiations
on both agriculture and services  will be broad in scope,  will affect  major trade interests of most
countries, either as exporters or importers,  and will be launched almost simultaneously,  they are by
general consent seen as the core subjects  for negotiations  in the WTO in the opening years of the new
century.
The Agreement on Agriculture and the GATS share a centrally important characteristic.  Each
provides a framework of principles, rules and procedures  whose  practical significance largely depends
on the specific liberalization  commitments entered into by individual WTO members.  Thus, for
agriculture, the degree of actual liberalization  that will be achieved  by each country, when all the
commitments it accepted  in 1994 have been carried into effect,  will be governed  by the tariff bindings
(maximum tariffs) and tariff quotas stated for each agricultural  product in Part I, Section I, of its
GATT schedule, and by the limitations on  its use of domestic  and export subsidies  set out in Part IV
of the same schedule. In the coming negotiations  on agriculture, some of the rules may be re-
examined, but it is expected  that the main focus will, in the words of the WTO representative of one
developing country,  be on "putting new figures into the existing framework":  in other words, with
setting lower tariff ceilings and more stringent limits on subsidies.  For services,  many key obligations
in the GATS apply, as regards each member country,  only to those services  for which the country
concerned has made liberalization  commitments in its services schedule. Although the next round of
negotiations on trade in services  will give attention to improvements  in the rules, its primary focus is
likely to be on extending the reach of the present rules by adding to the coverage  of VWTO  members'
services schedules.
1. Agriculture 3
The commitment to new negotiations  on agriculture is in Article 20 of the 1994 Uruguay  Round
Agreement on Agriculture. The Article states that "the long-term objective  of substantial  progressive
reductions in support and protection  resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing  process" and
provides that "negotiations for continuing  the process will be initiated one year before  the end of the
3 See also Sanitary and Phytosanitary  Measures,  below.8
implementation period". It specifies  that the negotiations are to take into account (a) experience  from
implementing reduction commitments under the agreement, (b) the effects  of these commitments on
world trade in agriculture, (c) non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing-
country  members of the WTO, and the objective  to establish a fair and market-oriented  trading system
and other objectives  mentioned in the agreement's Preamble  and (d) what further commitments are
necessary  to achieve  these objectives.
Article 20 thus implies that the negotiations on agriculture shall start by 31 December 19994,  this
being one year before the end of the six-year implementation  period during which developed  countries
are required to carry out their commitments  to reduce or limit agricultural tariffs, domestic support
and export  subsidies. No termination date is specified.  However,  Article 13 of the agreement, the
time-limited "peace clause" that restricts  the right to take countervailing  action against certain
support measures and subsidies, is effective  for a nine-year period. Its expiry  at the end of 2002 may
serve to encourage conclusion of the negotiations  by that date. Even then, developing  countries will
still be twelve months short of the ten-year  implementation  period which applies to the specific
commitments they have made under the 1994 agreement.
The commitmerLt  to new negotiations  is not questioned  by any government, and is accepted  as one of
the most challenging elements in the WTO's built-in agenda. Not surprisingly, the main exporters of
agricultural products have been anxious to ensure that appropriate  preparations be made in the WTO
to ensure that the negotiations  begin promptly. Importers, along with some other countries, have
resisted any early start on real negotiations,  but agreed 5 at the WTO's Ministerial Conference  in
Singapore  in December 1996  to include agricultural issues in the "process of analysis and exchange of
information" launched at that time "to allow Members  to better understand the issues involved and
identify their interests before  undertaking the agreed negotiations  and reviews". This "AIE" process
is now in progress, for agriculture, through informal discussions  in the WTO's Committee on
Agriculture. The meetings,  closed to observers,  are reported to be discussing  "topics in the areas of
market access, clomestic  support and export subsidies,  as well as issues of interest to developing
countries"6 _i.e.,  all the basic issues covered  by the Agreement on Agriculture.
Although the papers so far discussed in informal AIE meetings have not been generally distributed,
their titles, and reports provided  to regular meetings of the committee,  indicate that the issues under
consideration  are to a great extent those already signalled by regular meetings of the Committee on
4 This is often interpreted as requiring  that negotiations  begin by 1 January 2000. As agricultural
exporters regularly point out, however,  its strict meaning is that negotiations should  begin before the
end of 1999.
5 Ministerial Declaration  of 13 December 1996 (WTO document WT/MIN(96)1DEC,  para. 19).
6Report  dated 24 November 1997 by the Chairman of the Committee  on Agriculture  to the General
Council (document  G/L/21  1).  Papers submitted  up to that time are listed in Annex II of the report.9
Agriculture, which reviews implementation  of member countries' Uruguay Round  obligations. The
great majority of the more  than twenty national submissions  have come  from Australia, New Zealand
and the United States, although Canada, the European Union and Uruguay have provided  papers on
specific matters. Papers by Pakistan, Peru and the Dominican Republic (jointly)  and by Cuba, have
dealt more generally with issues of interest to developing  countries. The WTO Secretariat  has been
asked to provide background  papers on many of the issues  discussed. No less than six papers concem
the application of tariff quotas. Differences  between quota administration mechanisms employed  by
individual countries, and divergent interpretations  of the Agriculture  Agreement's provisions  on this
subject,  have been evident in the committee's meetings.  Other subjects  which have elicited multiple
contributions are domestic support and export subsidies,  both widely regarded as principal issues for
future negotiations, the "blue box" payments made by governments  under production-limiting
programmes, the special  safeguard mechanism  introduced  by Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, the role of state-trading enterprises (seen  variously as distorting agricultural trade or, on
the contrary, as stabilizing  supplies and prices), and special  and differential treatment for developing
countries. Further individual  papers have discussed  implementation  of tariff commitments, sectoral
trade liberalization, and data supplied  through notifications.
In his report to the March 1998  meeting of the Committee  on Agriculture on the latest round of
informal discussions, the chairman of the committee said he would be consulting  with members on
how to focus  further work on special and differential treatment  for developing  countries in the
contexts of market access,  food security,  domestic support,  export subsidies,  notification requirements
and technical assistance.
Australia, which led efforts by agricultural exporters  before  the Singapore  meeting to launch the AIE
process, provided  some comments  on the first meetings.'  In its view, the discussions  had provided
members with a better understanding  of some of the issues involved,  and should enable them to
identify  their interests ahead of the negotiations. Australia has also stressed, however,  that all issues
likely to be included in the next round of agricultural negotiations  should  be covered. The committee
chairman's November report indicates  that some member countries  may not be ready for this: it
mentions  their reluctance at this stage to permit collection of information on trade flows on tariff lines
which had tariffs resulting from the Uruguay  Round tariffication  process. This kind of basic data
collection seems to be regarded by these govemments  as going  beyond the AIE process. The same
governments are unwilling to discuss, at this stage, what kind of framework, agenda and timetable,
other than that provided  by the Agreement on Agriculture  itself, would be needed to initiate the
negotiations. In summary,  the AIE process  is helping to identify and clarify issues for the coming
The summary report of the Committee's meeting of 19-20  March 1998 (document  G/AG/R114)
includes the chairman's report on further AIE meetings held in January and March 1998.
7Statement  by Mr. Ted Delofski,  Permanent Representative  of Australia, to the WTO General
Council, 16 December 1997 (WT/GC(97)/ST/4).10
negotiations but -so far, at least-- is not significantly  closing gaps between national viewpoints, nor
tackling the practical preparations required for launching negotiations. Some members  of the Cairns
Group of agricultural exporters believe  the value of the process will be exhausted by the end of 1998.
Because negotiations on agricultural trade have such a long history in the GATT, and there is no sign
that governments  wish to alter the basic approach  adopted by the Agreement  on Agriculture, it is
reasonably dcear  what positions most individual WTO  members  will take in the negotiations. In
general, each is expected  to adopt much the same stance as in the Uruguay  Round.
During the Round, the two principal protagonists  in the agricultural negotiations  were the United
States and the European Community  (European  Union). The United States was seeking improved
market access for its own wide range of export products, notably  including grains, maize, soybeans,
beef, poultry and citrus, and also advocated  a complete  prohibition on export subsidies, and
limitations on domestic subsidies.  The European Union adopted  an essentially defensive  stance
throughout the negotiations, seeking  to maintain as far as possible  the market access  restrictions and
export and domestic subsidies  that were the principal instruments of its Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP).  External.  pressures from its negotiating  partners in the Round played a part in persuading the
EU to accept the multilateral liberalization  commitments that finally emerged. However,  the extent of
these commitments  was dictated  by reforms  to the CAP which it undertook  for largely  internal
reasons, these reforms  themselves being the product  of an extremely  difficult negotiation among EU
members  that took place during the Round. The efforts of the United States  were supported in most
respects,  and especially  on export subsidies, by the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters, a group
whose membership included both developed  and developing  countries and which succeeded  in finding
a common voice on most issues in the agricultural negotiations and in maintaining pressure for
radical liberalization and reform. The European Union found allies in several quarters: among
candidates for membership in the Union, who would expect to adopt the CAP; among some
developing countries who feared the loss of preferential  access  to EU markets as a result of MFN
liberalization; and from countries which maintained comparably  protective  regimes  for agriculture,
such as Norway, Switzerland, Japan and Korea. The efforts  of the latter two countries  to maintain
their prohibition on imports of rice were an important strand in the negotiations. A group of
developing countries  which included Egypt, Jamaica, Mexico  and Peru, among others, sought  to
protect the position of net food importing countries  which feared a rise in their food costs as a result of
cuts in export su,bsidies  and other reforms. This comparatively  clear-cut picture of the different
interests in the Round  was blurred by the existence of specific  national aims at variance with the
general stance of the country concerned: for example, the United States and Canada (a Cairns Group
member) sought to maintain their highly protective  regimes for sugar and dairy products, respectively.
The line-up for the coming negotiations is likely  to be very similar. The United States will push hard
for further liberalization, and will also want to take up specific  aspects of the arrangements11
established by the Agreement on Agriculture which it believes  have not worked as they should, such
as application of tariff quotas and some activities  of state-trading  enterprises. The European Union
will again be engaged in reform of the CAP, this time under the combined  pressure of continuing
difficulties in meeting the budgetary  cost of the CAP and the need to prepare itself for the accession of
Eastern European countries  which are far more dependent  on agriculture than its present members.
Neither the United States nor the European Union have yet spelled out their objectives. Cairns Group
members  have recently stated that the negotiations should  "achieve  fundamental reform which will
put trade in agricultural products on the same  basis as trade in other goods". As in the Uruguay
Round, they have stated a maximalist position which calls for "early,  total elimination and
prohibition" of all forms of export  subsidies, deep cuts to all tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation,
removal of non-tariff barriers "without exception", a substantial  increase in trade volumes under tariff
rate quotas, and elimination  of all trade-distorting  domestic subsidies.  Cairns members  will also
pursue closer regulation of export credits  for agricultural products, a declared  but unfulfilled objective
of the Agreement on Agriculture. They  have endorsed  the principle  of special and differential
treatment for developing countries. 8 The positions of Japan and Korea will be affected  by the looming
expiry  of the periods during which they enjoy special  treatment for imports  of rice.  If Japan seeks  to
maintain exceptional  restrictions on such imports, it will have to negotiate  the right to do so, in
exchange  for "additional and acceptable  concessions"  during the year 2000 - that is, early in the main
agricultural negotiations. Korea is in the same situation, except that its deadline is four years later.9
As regards meeting the concerns of net food importers,  it has been suggested that the negotiations
might include commitments  to limit export  restrictions, and possibly also export  taxes, to assure them
of greater security  of supplies. However,  sympathy  with the net food importers appears limited, even
among other developing countries, as it seems  widely felt that supply  developments  since the end of
the Uruguay Round have not borne out their fears.
Individual developing  countries, whether or not they make common cause as members  or sympathetic
supporters of the Cairns Group  or of  the group of net food importers,  will be pursuing improvements
in market access  for particular products of which they are competitive  suppliers, in some cases for the
first time.  Examples are dairy products (Argentina),  wine (Argentina, Chile and several Eastern
European suppliers),  frozen food and jams (Egypt),  fruit and vegetables (Kenya and Mexico) and tea
in bags (Sri Lanka). Given the general tariffication  achieved  in the Uruguay  Round, improvements in
market access  will be largely a matter  of tariff bargaining. As yet, little thought has been given to
possible  general formulas for tariff reduction. One important influence on negotiations is likely to be
the extent to which regional moves to reduce agricultural tariffs have progressed  by the time the WTO
negotiations  open. In particular, the APEC summit meeting of November 1997 agreed that fish and
8 Communique and "Vision Statement"  of Cairns Group  Ministers, Sydney,  3 April 1998.  Members of
the Group are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,  Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. Hungary, a candidate for EU
membership,  withdrew from the group in February 1998.12
fish products (excluded  from the Agreement on Agriculture) should  be included in a priority list for
early APEC sectoral negotiations, and also agreed to take up the food sector as well as oils and oilseed
products. Some countries  will also hope to improve market access  for their agricultural exports
through negotiated changes in the administration  of tariff quotas. Although  the larger exporters have
made the running on this subject  in the AIE discussions  so far, it concerns  small producers too:
several developing countries dependent  on exports of sugar, rum, bananas and beef complain that
complex quota arrangements are a
serious hindrance to their trade.
One possible new element in future negotiations  on agricultural issues is an effort currently being
made in Geneva  by an informal group of developing  countries, including  both members and non-
members  of the Cairns Group, to find conmmon  ground among themselves.  The paper on developing-
country issues  contributed  by Pakistan and others to the current AIE discussions  in the Agriculture
Committee is a first fruit of these informal discussions.
2. Services
Article XIX of the General Agreement on Services  requires WTO members  to "enter into successive
rounds of negoliations, beginning not later than five years from the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement and periodically  thereafter, with a view to achieving a progressively  higher level of
liberalization". The deadline  for starting the first such round is therefore I January 2000.  As in the
case of agriculture, no termination date for the negotiations is set. The GATS does not have a general
timetable for putting obligations into force comparable  with that for agriculture. In principle, all
GATS obligations entered into force on 1 January 1995 (although national schedules  of services
commitments rnay provide  that particular concessions  will  become effective  at later dates). Even
developing-country  participants in the new round of services  negotiations in general should  not,
therefore, find themselves  negotiating  new obligations  at a time when their previous commitments
have yet to come into force.
Article XIX gives more guidance on the content of, and preparations  for, these negotiations than the
corresponding  provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. On content,  the negotiations  are to be
directed to "the reduction  or elimination  of the adverse  effects  on trade in services  of measures as a
means of providing effective  market access". Due respect is to be given to national policy  objectives
and  levels of development.  Developing  countries  are to have flexibility for opening fewer sectors,
liberalizing  fewer types of transactions, progressively  extending market access  in line with their
development  situation and, when providing market access  to foreign service suppliers, making access
subject to conditions  aimed at some broad objectives  set out in Article IV.  On preparations for the
9  Agreement on Agriculture,  Annex 5.13
negotiations, Article XIX calls on the WTO's Council  for Trade in Services  to carry out an
assessment of trade in services  in overall  terms and on a sectoral basis, with reference to the objectives
of the GATS, including those in Article IV. Negotiating guidelines  are to cover two specific points of
interest to developing countries: the treatment of autonomous  liberalization  undertaken by members
since previous negotiations, and the special  treatment to be given to least-developed  countries. The
question of credit for autonomous  liberalization, in particular, is one which was never satisfactorily
settled in the Uruguay Round. Countries  which had recently liberalized  their trade policies found that
developed countries  were unwilling to give them negotiating credit for doing so unless they accepted
formal commitments not to re-impose  restrictions.  Mexico  was a leader during the Round in seeking a
means of obtaining some form of credit without  giving such a formal binding, and may be expected  to
take the question up again in the coming  negotiations  on services.
Like other elements in the WTO  work program, the new services round is covered  by the decision at
the 1996 Ministerial Conference  to start a process of analysis and exchange  of information "to allow
Members  to better understand the issues involved  and identify their interests". Because priority was
given in 1997 to completing  two major sectoral negotiations  already in progress, on basic
telecommunications  and financial services,  the analysis and information  exchange process is only just
beginning. The Services  Council  agreed in May 1998  that the process should  consist initially of a
sector-by-sector  discussion, during the period June-October  1998,  of regulatory  and other problems
that might constitute  trade barriers on which negotiations  could be fruitful. As a preliminary step,  the
WTO Secretariat has prepared papers on the economic  effects  of services  liberalization  and on the
shortcomings  of statistics on trade flows in servicesl 0, as well as a series of notes on trade in
individual service sectors. At some stage, the Services  Council  will also have to begin considering  the
guidelines and procedures  for the coming negotiations,  as required by Article XIX, but most
delegations  agree that it is too early yet to do so."  The expectation  is that, as in the Uruguay Round,
negotiations will be on the basis of specific  requests and offers rather than an overall reduction
formula.
Article XIX, as noted, foresees  that the focus of future rounds of services  negotiations should  be the
enlargement of market access. The fact that all present access  commitments  are recorded  on the basis
of positive  lists (i.e., they state what access is permitted, rather than what is not allowed)  is an
indication of their comparatively  limited coverage,  and of the scope  for further liberalization.
Four separate negotiations  on issues of market access  for services  have taken place since the Uruguay
Round ended, and have provided  some lessons for the future.  Sectoral  negotiations  in 1995-96  on
liberalization of maritime transport services failed to produce an acceptable package, and were
suspended, although with agreement  to return to the subject  in the broader  negotiations from 2000. In
1o WTO documents S/CIW/26  and SIC/W/27 respectively.14
this case, the principal lesson is perhaps that a separate sectoral negotiation  is unlikely  to succeed
unless there is some balance of interest among participants in achieving such success. For services as
for goods (where agriculture remains  the leading example),  it is hard to achieve  significant results if
countries  with a significant weight in the negotiations  are reluctant to liberalize a particular sector of
trade and are not offered  compensating  openings in sectors of greater interest to them. Limited
negotiations  in 1.994-95  on "movement of natural persons" ("Mode  4" in the GATS  jargon) focused
on securing commitments to allow individual qualified  professionals  such as computer specialists  and
other experts to work  abroad. This is an area of particular interest to certain developing  countries;
some, indeed, such as Egypt and Kenya,  see it as the principal aspect of the coming round of services
negotiations  in which they can look  for real gains. India was especially  active in the recent
negotiations, and other countries such as Korea seem  well placed to take advantage of opportunities
that might arise in future for supplying  -for instance-- civil engineering services that might include
provision of necessary  skilled labour. However,  access  by foreign  workers to the domestic  employment
market is a notoriously  sensitive issue in almost all countries. A common  feature of the services
schedules of WTO members  is that although they show  varying degrees  of readiness to open their
markets to foreign supply of services through cross-border  transactions  or through the establishment
of foreign firms in the domestic market, all are extremely  restrictive  as regards Mode 4. The third and
fourth post-Uruguay  Round sectoral negotiations, on the supply  of basic telecommunications  services
and financial services,  experienced  some delays  but were both completed  successfully  in 1997. They
showed  what could be achieved  if developed  countries  shared a strong commitment  to success  and
developing countries, even if less enthusiastic, were prepared to go along. They  also provided  a
reminder that unilateral liberalization  of domestic policies  affecting services,  as well as goods, can
open up fresh opportunities  for multilateral negotiations.  Many participants in the negotiations,
having liberalized their telecoms  and financial services  markets, made considerably  better market-
opening offers in 1997 than they had as recently  as 1995 and 1996.  Most countries  also committed
themselves to a negotiated  set of regulatory principles for telecom services,  setting an interesting
precedent for other service sectors. Continuing  deregulation of national markets for services, as well
as recognition  by governments  that the existence of WTO  bindings helps to attract foreign investment,
encourage optimism about prospects for improved market access  and regulatory  commitments for
services.  The United States, the most forceful  participant in previous GATS negotiations, has
indicated  that it will be most interested  in opening up "dynamic  service sectors, such as express
delivery, environmental,  energy, audio-visual,  and professional  services". 1 2
The coming round  of negotiations will cover a number of other services-related  matters. The GATS
calls for two specific issues to be taken up not later than the year 2000: a review of the Article II
exemptions  by which many WTO members  have retained the right to give better-than-MFN  treatment
to certain service suppliers, and an examination of whether the present narrow coverage of air
S/C/W/3 1.15
transport services could be extended. Neither issue has yet aroused  much discussion. Other
negotiations left over from the Uruguay  Round, and now under the responsibility  of the Working
Party on GATS Rules, have made little progress, and may well also be caught up in the new general
round.  These concern safeguards  (GATS Article  X), government  procurement  (Article XIII) and
subsidies  (Article XV). The working party has as yet reached no agreement  on whether the GATS
should be equipped  with provisions  on emergency  safeguard  action, let alone on what form such
provisions might take, although obscrvers  seem  fairly certain that substantive  negotiations will
eventually  take place. (Originally supposed  to have been completed  by the beginning of this year, the
current deadline for their completion  is 30 June 1999.)  Developing  countries generally favour
creation of an emergency  safeguard provision, and argue that its existence might make them more
willing to take on liberalization  commitments in the services sector. The major developed  countries
have yet to be convinced  that safeguard  rules for services  are needed or indeed would be feasible. On
both government procurement  and subsidies,  the working party is still at the stage of gathering
information, and of exchanging preliminary ideas on the scope  for negotiated  rules. As far as
concerns government procurement,  there is an overlap with work  elsewhere  in the WTO, discussed
below: possible disciplines  to increase the transparency of government  purchasing  practices for both
goods and services are under study in a working party set up after the Singapore  meeting, and
liberalization of public-sector purchases of services is widely thought most likely to take place in the
context of efforts to enlarge the coverage  and membership  of the existing limited-membership
Agreement on Government  Procurement.
A further negotiation already under way concerns  the supply of professional  services,  an aspect of
Mode 4, and thus of particular interest to some developing countries. The right to supply professional
services is in most countries subject  to possession  of specific  professional  qualifications,  and to
technical standards  and licensing requirements. A joint initiative by India and the UJnited  States  at
the end of the Uruguay Round  led to a decision
13 to seek "to establish  multilateral disciplines with a
view to ensuring that, when specific  commitments  are undertaken, such regulatory  measures do not
constitute unnecessary  barriers to the supply  of professional  services". Although negotiations  under
the decision have focused initially on regulations affecting  the accountancy  sector, the disciplines
defined seem quite largely applicable  to other professional  services  as well. Success  in these
negotiations could be helpful to some developing  countries, particularly in Latin America, that are
interested in gaining access  to markets in neighbouring  countries for services such as accountancy,
law and engineering.
(b) Other subjects covered by the WTO agreements
12 Speech  by President Clinton at WTO Ministerial Conference,  18 May 1998.
13 Ministerial Decision on Professional  Services, April 1994.16
1.  Institutions: the WTO, dispute settlement,  trade policy  reviews and "transparency"
The World Trade Organization itself,  the much-strengthened  and extended dispute settlement
provisions, and the system  of regular trade policy  reviews were the main institutional innovations  of
the Uruguay Round. There is no indication that any member  country  seeks to call them into question
in any fundamental respect, or to add substantially  to them. However,  their functioning could be
affected  by a US initiative, supported  by Canada and now taken up by the WTO, to "consider how to
improve the transparency of WTO operations".'4
No provision  exists for review of the WTO agreement, although that would not prevent changes being
made if member countries so agreed. The main purpose of the agreement is to link, as a single set of
obligations,  the substantive  trade rules embodied  in the separate  agreements  on goods, services and
intellectual property. Criticisms have been expressed on such matters as the slow-moving  procedures
for accession to the WTO, lack of substance in the role of the Council  for Trade in Goods,  and the
level of the minimum budget contribution  payable by countries with a small share in world trade.
However, these problems are not inherent in the very broad terms of  the relevant articles of the WTO
agreement. Some could probably  be overcome  by appropriate administrative changes; in the case of
accessions, the problem lies principally with individual acceding  and member countries. At this early
stage in the WTO's life, no country is asking for changes in the articles of agreement.
A full review of the Dispute Settlement  Understanding  (DSU)  is to take place during 1998. A meeting
of the Dispute Settlement  Body in March 1998  agreed that, as a starting point, WTO members  should
submit informal written suggestions  as soon as possible  as to the issues that should be taken up .The
separate  Ministerial decision on the review,  taken as part of the Uruguay  Round package in April
1994,  prescribes  that the review shall be followed  by a decision  by the WTO's next Ministerial
Conference  (which will be held in late 1999) "whether to continue, modify  or terminate such dispute
settlement rules and procedures". Theoretically,  the review could lead to abandonment  of the tighter
rules for handling complaints which have given the WTO the teeth which the GATT  lacked. No one
in fact expects this.
Criticisms of the DSU must be distinguished  from those of the rules which it serves to enforce. A
recent example of confusion is provided  by some US comments  on the outcome of an American
complaint on behalf of Kodak about problems of access  to the Japanese  market for photographic  film.
The examining panel has been criticized for not taking into account claims that restrictive business
practices contributed  to these problems. Similarly,  environmentalists  have condemned  a recent panel
report which upholds a complaint  by India, Malaysia,  Pakistan and Thailand against a US law that
14 Ministerial Declaration approved at the end of the Second Session  of the WTO  Ministerial
Conference,  Geneva, 20 May 1998.17
bans imports of shrimp caught  by methods which endanger sea turtles. They argue that the WTO
should put environmental goals ahead of the trade rules. However,  WTO  panels are called upon to
judge disputes in the light of WTO obligations, and those obligations do not at present extend to
competition issues, or give primacy to environmental  goals. The Kodak and shrimp cases are
arguments for negotiating multilateral rules on competition,  or on trade-related  environmental issues,
not for changing the DSU. A more legitimate argument, heard in particular from some developing
countries and especially  from India, is that the WTO is proving to be a highly legalistic organization:
far more so than the GATT, which in their view showed  greater sensitivity in its rules to the need for
equity, particularly in its treatment of developing countries. The DSU is a key element in bringing
this new legalism to bear, since it provides  the basis on which formal complaints can be brought
against governments that do not fulfil their obligations under WTO  agreements, and its rules deprive
those governments  of the possibilities  of blocking a complaint  that existed under the GATT. The
current banana disputes are an example. When originally raised under the GATT, the complaints
could ultimately  be ignored. Under the automatic  DSU procedures  they cannot.  This revelation has
come as a severe  shock to the banana producers,  and to some other developing countries  as well.l 5
However, as critics such as India acknowledge,  the way  to make the WTO more responsive  to
considerations of equity towards  developing countries  (or, it might be added, towards  environmental
concerns, considerations  of public accountability  or other non-economic  ends deemed desirable) is to
draft or redraft the WTO's substantive  rules appropriately,  rather than to deprive the organization as a
whole of its teeth.
This said, criticisms have been levelled  against the DSU's own rules and procedures. Responding  to
criticism from non-governmental  organizations, President Clinton has proposed  16 that "hearings by
the WTO be open to the public, and all briefs  by the parties be made publicly available" and that "the
WTO provide the opportunity  for stakeholders  to convey  their views ... to help inform the panels in
their deliberations". Most WTO members  can be expected  to resist any such proposal,  just as they
reacted with outrage to the recent attempt of a non-governmental  organization (the World Wide Fund
for Nature) to submit its own "amicus brief' to a panel. Nevertheless,  as at least some other WTO
members recognize, public concerns  about the accountability  of a powerful  new international
organization demand a constructive  response. The consistent and immediate leaking of supposedly
confidential interim reports from panels, for example, although denounced  by the WTO's Director-
General, with support from many WTO member  governments, suggests (as President Clinton also
proposed) that present rules on publication  will have to be eased or abandoned.  More technical issues
15 St.Lucia's Foreign Minister, speaking for the ACP countries at a meeting in Barbados, has said that
the WTO "failed miserably  in the first test in which the interests of powerless  developing countries
were pitted against those of transnational corporations  based in the leading industrialized world".
(Agence France Presse, 8 May 1998.)
16 Speech  by President Clinton at WTO  Ministerial Conference,  18 May 1998.  Detailed proposals
(WT/GCIW188  and WTIGC/W/92)  were tabled by the United States and the European Union in the
General Council on 22 July.18
concern such matters as the right of a complainant to attend consultations  held with another
complainant on the same matter, and the rights of third parties in securing implementation  of panel
recommendations.  In general, developing  countries, like the weaker participants in any other legal
system, recognize their interest in having an equitable, effective  and accessible  dispute settlement
system in the WTO.
Developing  countries feel themselves at a disadvantage  in dispute settlement  proceedings,  particularly
if the opposing  party is (as is often  the case) the United States  or the European Union. The issues are
often very technical, and developed-country  governments  can call on their own legal expertise,  as well
as that of legal advisers  to the major corporations  often involved. The WTO Secretariat's legal
service is still small, and to the extent it can provide  technical assistance does so largely on procedural
matters. Developing  countries involved  in disputes are likely to find it necessary  to hire expensive
legal assistance;  those who do so may find -as did the Caribbean  banana producers-that  their private
legal advisers are excluded  from panel hearings because  they are not government  officials. The latter
problem appears to have been eased, but it is still felt that there should  be a clear right for developing
countries to have the benefit in panel proceedings  of the presence of non-governmental  legal or other
experts.  Some  developing countries are consulting  among themselves on these problems.  One idea
under discussion  by them is that a legal service should be established within the WTO Secretariat
specifically  to advise  developing countries  on both procedural  and substantive  aspects of disputes in
which they are involved. A possible  alternative, less liable to jeopardize  the neutral status of the
Secretariat (which has already on occasion  been attacked from both sides of the Atlantic as having
unduly influenced the outcome of certain dispute proceedings)  would be to establish funding for
independent legal counsel.
The Trade Policy  Review  Mechanism, an essentially uncontroversial  element  in the WTO, is to be
reviewed  during 1999,  with the results of the appraisal to be presented to the next Ministerial
Conference. There is no indication  that major changes will  be sought by any WTO members.
However,  the prescribed  frequency for reviews (every  two years for the United States, European
Community,  Japan and Canada; every four years for the sixteen next-largest traders; and every six
years -or longer for least-developed  countries-for  the rest) has been criticized,  particularly by the
European Community. More broadly, Switzerland  has expressed doubts,  which other members  may
share, whether this major activity of the WTO  yields benefits  commensurate  with its costs.
"Transparency", in the WTO, is a code-word  with at least two meanings. In its first and older
meaning, it refers  to the policies and practices  of governments. Article X of the GATT requires that
trade regulations "be published promptly  in such a manner as to enable governments  and traders to
become acquainted with them". The concept  has been developed  much further over the years, and
particularly as a result of the Uruguay  Round. Member countries  must now not only publish
information about their trade-related  policies and actions, but in many cases also notify such19
information to the WTO. Present notification  obligations  are far-reaching and (in the view of many
members, not all of them developing countries)  burdensome. A post-Uruguay  Round effort to identify
requirements that might be superfluous,  or could be simplified,  yielded little, but may well be renewed
in the context of reviews  of individual WTO agreements.  Smaller developing countries  would
particularly welcome  any relief from their notification  obligations,  which form a significant part of
their total WTO-related workload. More recently,  the goal of greater transparency has been strongly
advocated  for the WTO itself by the United States, largely in response  to pressures from non-
governmental organizations, especially  those interested in environmental  and labour issues. The
United States has long urged that some meetings,  and particularly  those on environmental  matters, be
open to the NGOs. President Clinton's proposal at the May 1998  Ministerial meeting that dispute
settlement proceedings  be open to the public,  referred  to above, was accompanied  by a further
proposal that the WTO should "listen to ordinary citizens" by providing "a forum where business,
labour, environmental and consumer  groups can speak out and help guide the further evolution  of the
WTO". Ministers responded,  to the extent that they formally recognized  "the importance of
enhancing public understanding of the benefits of the multilateral trading system  in order to build
support for it", and agreed to consider how to improve the transparency  of WTO operations."
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway  appear to agree fairly  whole-heartedly  with the US
call for greater transparency. As shown in an initial discussion  in the WTO General Council in July
1998,  other countries are much more reticent: many fear that the efficiency  of the WTO could suffer if
meetings are opened to the public, and developing  countries  are particularly  reluctant to see greater
weight given to environmental issues and the question of labour  standards.
2.  Tariffs
Negotiations  to improve market access  by reducing and binding import duties have been a core
element in multilateral trade negotiations since the earliest days of the GATT. There is no provision
in the WTO's built-in agenda for another round of such negotiations. In their Singapore  declaration,
WTO Ministers renewed a commitment  to "progressive  liberalization  and elimination of tariff and
non-tariff barriers to trade in goods", but did not include tariffs in the long list of subjects  on which
they agreed to start a process of analysis and exchange of information. Australia  and New Zealand
had pressed for tariffs to be taken up, but developing  countries  failed to give them support, apparently
from lack of interest. Nevertheless, most observers  agree that any broad round of multilateral
negotiations in the WTO must cover tariffs.
7  Ministerial Declaration approved at the end of the Second Session  of the WTO Ministerial
Conference,  Geneva, 20 May 1998.20
In general, tariff reductions on industrial products agreed in the Uruguay Round are being brought
into force in five equal annual instalments, of which the last will be made on 1 January 1999.  As
regards tariffs on agricultural products, phased reductions  by developed  countries will be completed
on 1 January 2000. Some  developing countries  are phasing in reductions  in agricultural tariffs over
ten years, with the final cut not due until 1 January 2004,  but many took advantage  of an option which
allowed them, if a duty was not already bound,  of fixing new maximum  tariffs ("ceiling  bindings")
which took effect  immediately  and are not subject  to further reductions. Thus, with the exception  of
final reductions of agricultural  tariffs that are being made by developing countries  using the ten- year
schedule, all tariff reductions  as a result of the Round will be fully in effect  by the time that the
prospective  wider WTO negotiations  would begin.
However, this is not the whole story. Many countries are currently engaged in reducing MFN tariffs
as a result of recent sectoral negotiations, notably  those which led to the Infonnation Technology
Agreement reached in March 1997. Most of the 40-odd signatories of the ITA will phase out tariffs
on the products concerned  by I January 2000. Negotiations  for an "ITA 2" have run into difficulty,
but have been suspended  rather than abandoned. Further sectoral negotiations  are in prospect,
particularly in the context of the member countries  of APEC, whose  economic leaders have identified
fifteen product categories  as candidates for early voluntary liberalization, with nine of these
categories  given priority and a target date of 1999  for starting the liberalization  process. 18 On a
preferential basis, ta:riff  reductions are taking place in Europe (mostly  between,  on one side, Western
European countries and, on the other, transition economies  which also have reached a number of free-
trade agreements  amriong  themselves),  in Latin America (especially  among and with the members  of
Mercosur)  and in Asia (notably among the ASEAN countries). Negotiations  will open in September
1998  between the Euiropean  Union and the more than 70 developing  countries of the ACP group on
replacement of the present Lome Convention. The EU is currently proposing that the trade
component of Lome should  be replaced by free trade area agreements.  Applicants for WTO
membership, of whom there are over 30, will be required to reduce  and bind their MFN tariffs in the
next few years. Mosit  are being pressed to accept  existing sectoral arrangements such as the ITA and
the plurilateral Agreement on Civil Aircraft  (which requires duty-free  treatment of aircraft and parts),
and to follow the example of those countries, mostly developed,  which committed  themselves in the
Uruguay  Round to zero or harmonized tariffs in sectors  which include agricultural equipment,  non-
ferrous metals and pharmaceuticals.
With such a range of sectoral, preferential and accession  tariff negotiations  in progress, the prospects
for a new multilateral tariff negotiation  might seem dim. However,  and in spite of the absence  of any
18 The selected categories (with the priority sectors italicized) are environmental  goods  and services,
the energy  sector, fish  andfish  products,  the food sector,  toys, natural  and synthetic  rubber, forest
products, fertilizers, gems andjewellery, the automotive  sector, oils and oilseed products, medical21
specific mention of tariffs in the May 1998 Ministerial  declaration, there are signs that they are not.
Enthusiasm for further sectoral agreements  is not universal. As one Latin American comments,
"cherry-picking"  by negotiating free-trade  agreements  in easy sectors  reduces potential support for
broader negotiations. Other developing-country  negotiators argue that their countries gain nothing in
exchange for liberalizing sectors in which they have no trade interest; one speaks strongly  of  "salami
tactics".  The ITA 2 negotiations  apparently  broke down largely  because India and Malaysia  objected,
from opposite sides,  to the proposed  product coverage.  On the other hand, another developing-country
delegate suggests that political pressure on small countries  is less in a sectoral negotiation  than when
across-the-board  liberalization is being discussed. The APEC initiative, which at the time of writing
appears to be running into trouble, stresses  voluntarism ("each economy  remains free to determine the
sectoral initiatives in which it will participate") and consistency  with "broad-based  multilateral
liberalization". In the absence  of wider MFN negotiations, Mexico  negotiates  mutual tariff reductions
with its Latin American neighbours  but, as a senior official  points out,  liberalization  already
undertaken through its membership of NAFTA means that the marginal cost of joining in a WTO
round would be very low. As for the acceding countries,  their present negotiations  are a one-way
affair. They are required to open their own markets,  but have no leverage  to gain tariff concessions
from WTO members. A multilateral tariff negotiation  would provide  their first chance to bargain in
the WTO for improved access  to export markets.
Among the developed  countries, Australia and New Zealand have now gained considerable  support,
most notably from the European Commission  and Japan. Observers  claim to detect growing
recognition  by the United States of the limitations of the sectoral  and regional approaches  to tariff
liberalization. Some developing countries,  however -and quite apart from whether they would
themselves be ready to reduce  their own tariff levels-- doubt  whether they could hope for significant
gains from new negotiations.  They feel that tariff levels in their export markets have in general been
reduced to a level at which they are no longer a major concern, and are not very hopeful  of significant
progress in removing remaining tariff peaks and escalation affecting  products of export interest to
them. Among these remaining tariff problems, everyone  cites textiles and clothing, leather and
footwear; more specific  national interests mentioned include petrochemicals  (Argentina),  consumer
electronics (Hong Kong'9 and ASEAN countries), rubber products (Sri Lanka), processed fruits,
vegetables and other food products (Argentina, Colombia,  Egypt and Sri Lanka). But both developed
and developing countries express  fears that these residual tariff obstacles  are such sensitive issues that
the governments  concerned may not find the political will to tackle them seriously.
equipment  and instruments,  chemicals,  civil aircraft,  and telecommunications  mutual recognition
arrangement.
19  Hong Kong, as a customs entity  distinct from the rest of China, retains its separate membership and
voice in the WTO.22
With no formal discussion  yet of tariff issues in the WTO, not much thought has been given to how
negotiations might be conducted. To the extent that a general tariff-reduction  formula might be
adopted, it is seen as logical that it should aim at harmonization  rather than at a standard percentage
cut, in order to reduce tariff peaks and escalation. Some developing-country  delegates suggest that, in
Latin America in particular, great scope  exists for reducing the gap between applied and bound tariff
rates, and that the resulting improved predictability  of access  to such markets as Brazil would be of
value to other developing countries. Many of the smallest and poorest developing countries, too,
maintain GATT-bound  tariff rates well above  their actual applied rates.  They  could gain some
worthwhile  bargaining power in future negotiations, without  risking much loss of protection  or
revenue, if they were prepared to offer reductions  in bound rates. The question, unresolved  in the
Uruguay Round negotiations, of how negotiating credit might be given for earlier autonomous
liberalization is likely  to be revived. Little is said in WTO meetings about the issue of erosion of
preferences,  probably  because their principal beneficiaries  are the countries  least active in the WTO.
In private discussion, representatives  of these countries  express  fears (reinforced  by the WTO
condemnation  of the European Union's banana regime, and by the latest EU proposals for replacing
the Lomd Convention)  that their preferential advantages are doomed gradually  to disappear.
3.Textiles  and Clothg
Along with agriculture, trade in textiles and clothing stands out as a WTO subject in which a large
proportion of developing countries  take a keen interest. Much more than for agriculture, they have
developed  common positions. These positions,  however,  are largely defensive.
Any discussion  of developing-country  interests in future negotiations  in the WTO must first take into
account the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. It is at present, and will remain for the next six and
a half years, the central fact in the policy environment  for exports of textiles and clothing by
developing countries to their principal markets in the developed  world. Yet at the same time it is
purely a transitional arrangement, designed  to regulate the shift from an initial situation in which a
network of bilateral agreements  imposed  quantitative restrictions on exports of textiles and clothing
from developing to developed  countries  to one in which trade in the sector should be free of such
restrictions and governed  only by the normal GATT rules. This shift is taking place over three stages
(1995-1997, 1998-2001  and 2002-2004). The agreement specifies  the means whereby an increasing
proportion of trade is being freed  from quantitative  restrictions ("integrated")  and the amount of trade
permitted under the remaining restrictions is being progressively enlarged. The agreement and all
restrictions under it "shall stand terminated" on 1 January 2005, "on which date the textiles and
clothing sector shall be fully integrated into GATT 1994".  Extension of the agreement is explicitly
excluded.23
There is thus nothing in the text of the agreement  to give rise to new negotiations  in the WTO. It
includes provisions  for major reviews  before  the end of each stage,  but these are intended only to
assess how the transition is going. The first such review,  recently completed,  showed  that developing
countries are in fact very dissatisfied  with progress  so far.  They  feel that the importing countries
(essentially  now the United States, the members  of the European Union, and Canada) have
disregarded  the spirit of the agreement  by applying  its letter in ways  that have brought about little or
no real liberalization  so far, and by supplementing  the effects  of quotas  by unjustified  anti-dumping
actions and restrictive  rules of origin. They fear that so much liberalization  is being left to the final
years of the transition period that full integration  may in fact not be achieved.  For their part, the
importers maintain that they are fulfilling their obligations, will continue to do so, and will meet the
deadline of 1 January 2005 for final removal  of quotas. They also complain  of the level of tariff and
non-tariff restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing maintained by developing  countries
themselves.
Faced  by the possibility  of new WTO  negotiations  starting around the year 2000, five  years or so
before the end of the transition period under the Agreement  on Textiles and Clothing,  developing-
country  exporters of textiles  and clothing  are anxious to avoid any opening up of the agreement.
Although  unhappy about how it is being applied,  they can look forward  to more substantial
liberalization  in the later stages of the transition period. Most seem  to believe  that, given the domestic
pressures  on governments  of the importing countries, there is no realistic  possibility  of accelerating
the removal of restrictions.  And having paid already in the Uruguay  Round package  for final
liberalization  in January 2005,  they are determined  to avoid paying a second  time in order to hold the
importers to their side of the bargain.
This is at present the sole area in which developing  countries  have found a strong common  voice in
the WTO. Twenty-three  exporting countries  are members  of the International Textiles and Clothing
Bureau (ITCB), a body through which they coordinated  their positions in the textiles negotiations
during the Uruguay  Round. During the recent major review  of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing in the WTO Council  for Goods,  the ITCB's chairman,  the representative  of Colombia,  made
the principal statements on the exporters' behalf, and its secretariat  provided  substantial  supporting
documentation. Individual exporting countries  also spoke,  with Hong Kong and Pakistan especially
forceful  and detailed  in their arguments, but there was no breach in the exporters' common  front. Nor
was there any public expression  of misgivings  about early liberalization  of trade in textiles and
clothing by those developing  countries  often  said to be able  to compete  only  because of their quota
entitlements  under the agreement.
Provided this solidarity is maintained, any new WTO  negotiations  on textiles and clothing seem likely
to be limited mainly  to efforts to reduce  the high tariffs prevailing  in the sector. In favour of some
success in tariff liberalization  is the support it would receive  from export interests  in both developing24
and developed  countries. Against would be the resistance to be expected  from the domestic industries
which have been so successful  over the years in persuading  their governments  not to liberalize, and
which, in the USA, EU and Canada (and India) already face the imminent removal of quantitative
restrictions.
Developing-country  exporters  of textiles and clothing express  fears that importing countries will
increasingly resort, as substitutes  for present quantitative  restrictions,  to changes in origin rules, anti-
dumping action, and measures supposedly  introduced  to protect  the environment  or labour  standards.
Their interest in these subjects,  discussed  below, is thus directly  linked to their sectoral export
interest.
4.  Technical barriers to trade, and sanitary  and phytosanitary  measures
These two subjects  can conveniently  be taken together, although  they are governed  by separate
agreements. The Agreement  on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), an extended  version of an earlier
successful  GATT agreement, demands  that technical standards  and regulations not be drawn up with
the aim of restricting trade. It encourages  the use of international  standards, and calls for national
testing and certifying  bodies  to avoid discrimination  against imports and, as far as possible,  to
recognize other countries' tests and certificates. It includes elaborate  procedures  for notification and
consultation,  and provisions  for technical assistance  to developing  countries  and for greater  flexibility
for these countries. The agreement  is fully in force. The Agreement on the Application  of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary  Measures (SPS) is linked  with the Agreement  on Agriculture. Similar in its basic
objectives  to the TBT agreement,  it recognizes  the right of govemments  to take measures  to ensure
food safety  and to protect  animal and plant health, but requires that such measures be applied only to
the extent necessary  to these ends and that they be based on scientific  principles and be maintained
only on the basis of scientific  evidence. The SPS agreement  is fully in force for most countries,
although least-developed  countries  have until the year 2000 to apply its requirements  on the treatment
of imports. Both the TBT and SPS  agreements  are widely  regarded as important defences  against the
imposition  of new non-tariff barriers  that could nullify  the dismantling of import duties and other
traditional obstacles  to market access.
The TBT agreement is subject  to review  every three years, and explicitly  envisages  that the committee
responsible  for it should  make proposals  for its amendment.  The first review,  held in 1997,  endorsed
the "capacity and potential" of the agreement  to achieve  its purpose, but identified a number  of
difficulties  and problems  encountered  in its operation. No amendments  to the agreement  were
proposed,  but its governing  committee  reached more than twenty  agreed conclusions  which add up to
a substantial  work  programme whose  results will be examined  at the next triennial review in the year
2000.  Several  proposed  elements  of the work  programme concern  technical assistance to developing
countries, and the application of special  and differential treatment  to them, including measures to help25
them develop  their own capacity to prepare and adopt technical regulations  and standards and a study
of technical barriers to market access  of developing  country  suppliers. 20
The first review of the SPS  agreement  is due this year, and has just begun. There is already
speculation  that the review may lead to negotiations. The agreement's rules have  been the basis of
some celebrated  recent disputes  in the WTO, and have the potential to give rise to others. One
dispute, over a European Union ban on the use of growth hormones for beef cattle, went essentially in
favour of the United States  and involves  very large US claims for compensation  for trade losses:  a
WTO panel, supported on appeal, found that the EU had not met the SPS requirement of scientific
evidence  to justify the ban.  Another  EU-US dispute is brewing over  EU members' reluctance to
approve the sale of genetically  modified  corn and soybeans. Motives  in both cases are no doubt
mixed, but the crucial clash is between an aroused and fearful public  opinion in Europe, and US
conviction  that the products concerned  are safe. Such disputes, leading under the Dispute Settlement
Agreement to unpalatable and binding conclusions,  put severe  strains on the SPS  agreement  and on
the dispute settlement  procedures  as well.
Further challenges  to the TBT and SPS agreements  will almost certainly  arise because the measures
they regulate are instruments  of choice for responding  to pressures not only from domestic  producers
seeking  protection,  but also from environmentalists  and other non-governmental  activists. Packaging
and labelling requirements,  requirements  that fishing methods  do not harm dolphins or sea turtles,
and regulations that limit the use of tropical  timbers all fall within the ambit of the two agreements,
and are liable to be found contrary to their provisions.  Anxiety  about the strains which high-profile
disputes could put on the agreements,  and on the WTO itself,  is widespread.
Developing  countries do not have a common  position on the agreements,  but they tend to express
similar concerns. They feel ill-equipped,  by comparison  with the technologically  advanced  developed
countries, to take part in formulating the international  standards established  in such bodies as the
International Organization for Standardization  ISO) and the FAO/WHO  Codex  Alimentarius
Commission,  and favoured  under the TBT and SPS agreements. They  find the notification
requirements  under the agreements  particularly  burdensome. They say they have difficulty  in finding
out, and meeting, the standards applicable  to their exports. (Burkina  Faso, Kenya and Papua New
Guinea, for example, cite difficulties  in demonstrating  that their exports of meat, fresh fruit and
vegetables,  and canned tuna, respectively,  meet SPS  requirements.) Some  believe that many measures
imposed  ostensibly  for environmental  or public health reasons  are in fact inspired by protectionist
objectives. Members of the Cairns Group  of agricultural  exporters, however,  are strong supporters  of
the SPS  agreement, and in their April Ministerial  declaration insisted  that the SPS review  should not
be used as a pretext to relax present disciplines  on the ground of non-scientific  arguments.
20  Report on the first triennial review of the TBT agreement  (WTO document  G/TBT/5).26
An important aspect of the agreements, as seen by some  thoughtful  representatives  of developing
countries, is that they are potentially  the most sensible means  of channelling environmental  concerns
in ways  that will not serve protectionist  ends or put strains on the multilateral  trade rules. If agreed
standards can be formulated, in ISO and other international  bodies,  to take account  of environmental
objectives  such as those laid down in multilateral  environmental  agreements, the potential for
subsequent  difficulties in the WTO could  be greatly  reduced.
5. Trade-related  investment measures
The Uruguay Round  negotiations  which resulted  in the Agreement  on Trade-related  Investment
Measures (TRIMs)  started out as an ambitious  effort by the United States  to establish new rules that
would prohibit governments,  when they authorize investments,  from attaching potentially  trade-
distorting conditions  to such authorizations.  The outcome  was modest:  it simply identified five types
of measure,  notably including the imposition  of local-content  requirements  on manufacturers,  as being
already contrary to the GATT requirements  of national treatment (Article  III) and avoidance  of
quantitative restrictions (Article XI). The agreement  required that all such measures be notified.
Developed  countries were required to eliminate them by 1 January 1997. Developing  countries,
however, have until 1 January 2000 to do so, and least-developed  countries  until 1 January 2002.
Moreover, developing and least-developed  countries  may be granted extension  of their transitional
periods if they can demonstrate  "particular difficulties"  in eliminating  outstanding  TRIMs, and the
decision of the WTO's Goods  Council  on such requests  is to take account  the development,  financial
and trade needs of the member concerned. Some  25 developing  countries  have notified  that they use
TRIMs of the types covered  by the agreement.
The TRIMs  agreement  is one of the few that envisages  future negotiations. Like several other
agreements,  it is to be reviewed,  in this case not later than 1 January 2000, with the possibility  that
appropriate  amendments  may be proposed  to the Ministerial Conference. In addition, however,  the
review is to include consideration  of "whether  the Agreement should  be complemented  with
provisions  on investment  policy  and competition  policy". 21 When negotiated,  this provision  was
widely  regarded as establishing  an opening for the more substantial  negotiations  on investment
desired especially  by the United States  and also for the negotiations  on competition  issues  which some
developing  countries considered  would  be necessary  as a matter of balance. The provision may yet
prove important, although separate discussion  of investment  and competition  policy  issues (see  below)
has in any case begun following  decisions at the Singapore  meeting in 1996.  As far as the TRIMs
agreement  itself is concerned,  no one at present seems to be suggesting  changes in its provisions.
21 Agreement on Trade-related  Investment  Measures,  Article 9.27
6.  Anti-dumping
The WTO anti-dumping agreement  (Agreement  on the Implementation  of Article VI of the GATT
1994)  was one of the most controversial  reached in the Uruguay  Round  negotiations. Its key
provisions  prescribe how governments  which use anti-dumping  measures should  establish  the
existence  of dumping and of damage,  or threat of damage,  to domestic  producers.  They lay down
procedures for anti-dumping investigations  and decisions  and for the imposition  and termination of
anti-dumping duties. Developing  countries,  in particular, were unhappy with the agreement, not least
because of a number of concessions  to US views made in the final days of the negotiations. The
agreement  is fully in effect  for all WTO members,  and has no provision  for general review. One issue
unsolved in the Uruguay  Round remains  open. The European  Union and United States  unsuccessfully
sought explicit authority  to act against efforts by suppliers to circumvent  anti-dumping  decisions by
such means as carrying out final assembly  of a product held to be dumped in a "screwdriver  plant" in
the importing country,  or in a third country. While it was agreed  that agreed  rules on "anti-
circumvention"  action were desirable,  and that discussions  should  continue in the Anti-Dumping
Committee,  no deadline  was set and the discussions  have so far been fruitless.  (Member countries
have not yet even reached a conclusion on their first topic for discussion: "What constitutes
circumvention?".) The WTO  Ministerial meeting in Singapore  set no work programme for anti-
dumping apart from an effort to improve notifications  and give more  technical assistance to
developing  countries.
The pattern of use of anti-dumping  action has shifted significantly  in recent years. The Anti-Dumping
Agreement was negotiated  when almost  all anti-dumping  measures  were imposed  by the United
States, European Union, Australia  and Canada, and when it was widely  thought that the reduction of
tariffs and import restrictions could well lead these countries  to rely increasingly  heavily  on anti-
dumping and other forms of contingent  protection. In fact, the most striking  trend has been towards
the use of anti-dumping  measures  by developing countries. Developing  countries  accounted  for 17
out of 23 notifications  of anti-dumping actions to the WTO  during the period July 1996-June  1997,
and the list of users is almost a roll call of the developing  countries  most active in the WTO: it
includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,  India, Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia,  Mexico, Peru, the
Philippines, Singapore,  Thailand and Venezuela.  2 2 Several  of the actions taken were against
suppliers in other developing  countries. A number  of countries, including  China and transition
economies  now negotiating accession  to the WTO, have said they will introduce  anti-dumping
legislation; Russia has just done so.  One reported consequence  is an increasing division of opinion
inside US industry over  anti-dumping issues:  while some  domestic  producers, notably  of steel, would
still prefer rules that would allow easier introduction  of anti-dumping  measures,  companies  with
strong export interests are more aware of the risk that weaker rules would expose  them to greater risks
in export  markets. A further new element in the situation is that the WTO is now discussing
22 Annual Report of the Committee  on Anti-Dumping  Practices,  G/L/204 (Annex B).28
competition  issues, and might one day negotiate  on them. Hong Kong, Korea and Mexico  have
pointed out that effective  competition  rules could make anti-dumping  action superfluous.
All of these changes seem  bound to affect  the outlook  for any future multilateral negotiations  on the
anti-dumping  rules. The United States, keenest in the Uruguay  Round  to tighten up the rules, no
longer appears  to seek changes, although  it still wants the existing  rules applied stringently. Some of
those developing countries  which use anti-dumping  measures  apparently find the rules hard to apply,
and would like them eased. Practical  experience  with the rules, as revealed  in the Anti-Dumping
Committee,  is that they are sometimes  applied arbitrarily, and that notifications  to the WTO are
inadequate. Hong Kong,  the most articulate  leader of efforts  during the Uruguay  Round  to restrain
the use of anti-dumping measures,  shares with Japan and Mexico  an interest in pursuing the issue
further, and it has been suggested that these  countries, and others, could form an alliance on anti-
dumping equivalent  to that which the Caims Group  provides for agricultural exporters.  Elsewhere,
however,  there are doubts  whether a basis exists at present for constructive  negotiation  on the anti-
dumping rules. Some  developing  countries  continue to fear that anti-dumping  measures may be used
as substitutes  for other restrictions,  particularly  the quantitative  restrictions  being phased out under
the Agreement  on Textiles and Clothing,  but they see  this as reason for close  attention to how the
rules are being applied, rather than for changing  the rules themselves. In sum, it appears  unlikely at
present that significant  changes will be made to the element  in the Uruguay  Round package  most
widely  criticized by outside  observers.
7.  Subsidies
Among the Uruguay  Round  agreements,  that on subsidies  and countervailing  measures is perhaps the
only one whose provisions  are significantly  less stringent  for developing  countries  and countries in
transition to a market economy  than for developed  countries. In general, the agreement  prohibits
subsidies  contingent  on export  performance  or the use of domestic  rather than imported goods, and
permits certain other subsidies  such as those for basic research and to help disadvantaged  regions. All
other subsidies  are "actionable",  the right to use countervailing  measures  being dependent,  as in
dumping cases,  on whether the subsidy  concerned  causes or threatens injury. The agreement  is not
fully in force. Although  the deadline for developed  countries  to phase out prohibited subsidies  has
passed, least-developed  countries and countries  with per capita GNP below $1,000  may maintain
export subsidies  indefinitely,  and all other developing  countries have  until January 2003 to remove
them, with a possibility  of extension in particular cases if this is found  justified by economic,  financial
or development  needs. Countries  in transition  to a market economy  must phase out prohibited
subsidies  by January 2002; until then, they also enjoy some immunity  from countervailing  measures
against their actionable subsidies.29
The subsidy  agreement  figures in the WTO  built-in agenda: two important  rules in the agreement
apply only provisionally,  and must both be reviewed  during the second  half of 1999. One establishes
a presumption  that certain subsidies,  such as those which amount to more  than 5 per cent of the value
of a product or are given to cover an industry's operating losses, give rise to adverse  trade effects.
This presumption  does not, however,  apply to developing  countries. A second  review is to decide
whether the permitted ("green") category  of subsidies  should  continue to exist: the United States, in
particular, has never been convinced  that any specific  subsidies  can be wholly  harmless to trade.  Two
further reviews,  one also during 1999  and the other at the end of the year, concern respectively  an
issue linked with the green category  of subsidies  and experience  gained of the export  competitiveness
rule (Article 27.6) which makes the right of developing  countries  to give export  subsidies  subject to
the product concerned  not gaining more than 3.25% of the world market.
Little, if any, interest is expressed  in Geneva  at present in new negotiations  on subsidies,  even if the
1999  review requirements provide  an opportunity  to open up the agreement. Concern  is far more  with
the implementation  of the agreement  than with its rules: many WTO members  have provided  little or
none of the information they should have supplied  more than three years ago about how they are
meeting their obligations  to bring their subsidy  regimes  into line with the rules. And as far as
developing  and transition countries  are concerned,  this is a particularly  clear instance of an agreement
whose  consequences  they have  yet to digest.
8.  Safeguards
The Agreement  on Safeguards  emerged  from the Uruguay  Round  in 1994,  some twenty years after
efforts  began to overhaul  the ineffective  Article XIX of the GATT. It represents  a trade-off which
outlaws "grey area" restrictions  such as voluntary export  restraints in exchange  principally for a
special mechanism  that, in certain circumstances,  allows  departure  from the general MFN rule to
apply particularly tight restrictions to the most dynamic suppliers.  This "quota modulation"  provision
(Article 5:2(b)), highly  controversial  when negotiated,  has so far remained unused, perhaps because
anti-dumping or countervailing  measures can be more  easily and less provocatively  applied. The
agreement is fully in force (except that a special  provision  allows  the European Union to continue to
restrict imports of Japanese  cars until the end of 1999),  and has no review  provisions  to figure in the
WTO's built-in agenda. No government  appears to seek  changes in the agreement,  but developing
countries  will continue to keep close  watch on how it is applied.
9. Customs Valuation
The Customs Valuation  Agreement (Agreement  on Implementation  of Article VII of the GATT 1994)
is a barely-modified  version of the Customs  Valuation "code" negotiated  during the Tokyo Round of
the 1970's.  The agreement  lays down a hierarchy  of valuation methods which must be followed  by
customs officers,  with the central purpose  of basing valuation  for customs  purposes  on the actual value
of the goods concerned.  Few developing  countries  signed the original code, mainly  because  of fears30
that it would hamper their ability  to challenge traders who might understate the value of goods. In
response to this concern, a 1994  Ministerial  decision allows developing  countries  some greater
flexibility  in applying  the agreement's rules. The agreement  is fully in force for developed  and
developing signatories of the original code, who include Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, India,
Mexico, and Zimbabwe.  Other developing  countries  are not required to apply the rules of the
valuation agreement  until January 2000, and can request a further extension;  they also have an extra
three years before  they need use one of the specified  valuation methods, and will retain some further
flexibility in other respects. Some  50 countries  are taking advantage  of these provisions,  which
recognize  the considerable  effort of adaptation  involved  in introducing  the new valuation rules, and
particularly in customs  services  to apply the rules. A similar effort will be required of those
developing  countries, as well as countries  in transition to a market economy,  that accede  to the WTO
in the next few years. At the instigation  of the United States, an effort is under way to step up
technical assistance  to countries  introducing  the customs  valuation rules, but even so, some of the
smaller developing  countries  are doubtful  whether the transition  periods available  to them are long
enough. The agreement  itself has given rise to few difficulties,  apart from the familiar problem of late
or missing notifications,  and seems not to be on anyone's list of prospective  WTO negotiations.  It is
however  another significant  element in the post-Uruguay  Round workload  that makes many
developing countries  hesitant about embarking  on new negotiatipns.
10.  Preshipment inspection
The Agreement  on Preshipment  Inspection  (PSI) was negotiated  in response  to increasingly
widespread  use by developing countries  of the services  of private  inspection companies  to reinforce
their customs  administrations  by checking,  often in the exporting country,  that the real value of goods
matches  their value as declared  for customs  purposes. Exporters  were concerned  that PSI could
hamper trade through extra costs and delays, and could interfere with contractual relationships
between  buyer and seller by imposing changes in agreed  prices. Guidelines are laid down for the use
and activities of inspection  firms, along with procedures  (which include an independent  review body,
thus far unused) to resolve disputes. The agreement  provides  for triennial reviews.  The first such
review took place in 1997,  and is acknowledged  to have shown  the existence  of many problems 23
The working party which carried out the review  made recommendations  both for immediate and
longer-term action. These include emphasis on the ultimate responsibility  of governments  for
customs  valuation and revenue  collection,  and the need for inspection entities to observe
confidentiality,  avoid conflicts of interest and issue their findings  promptly. Work will continue in
1998  on a number of points, including a possible  code of conduct  for PSI entities. The eventual
outcome could include some amendment  of the agreement.  More than 30 developing-country
members  of the WTO,  the great majority African  countries,  appear to use PSI companies  for customs
23 Report of the Workcing  Party on Preshipment  Inspection  to the General  Council, G/L/21431
purposes 24, and thus have a clear direct interest in this work. However,  no one appears to be
suggesting that improvements  to the PSI agreement,  even if negotiations  were to prove necessary,
would need to be linked with, or await, future WTO negotiations  on other subjects.
11. State tradine
The WTO's built-in agenda includes continuing work, without a deadline, on the issue of state
trading. Article XVII of the GATT, clarified by an Uruguay  Round Understanding on that article, is
intended to prevent enterprises that are government-owned,  or which have been granted exclusive  or
special rights or privileges by the government,  from using their powers  to distort trade by favouring
particular suppliers,  subsidizing  exports or fixing high prices.  A working party set up under the
Understanding to examine notifications  by WTO members  of enterprises covered  by the definition
reached agreement in April 1998 on a new questionnaire  for the notifications  (the old one had stood
unrevised for nearly thirty years) and is now developing an illustrative  list of relationships between
these enterprises and their governments, and of relevant activities. This work should  be completed
during 1998,  and the obvious  next step, if member  countries so agreed, would  be to consider ways of
tightening the disciplines  of Article XVII.
The United States  and the European Union would like to move on to this stage. In part, this is because
they have specific  problems with the role played  by agricultural marketing  boards in some other
developed  countries - above all with Canada, but also with Australia and New Zealand. Canada's
administration of tariff rate quotas for milk and dairy products, the subject of a current dispute with
the United States, is seen as an example  of how a marketing  board can prevent a market-opening
agreement from having its expected  effects. But the US and EU also suspect marketing  boards in
general of being used to cloak subsidies  and protection  for domestic  producers.
At the present fact-finding stage  of WTO work on state trading, the United States  and European
Union have found some allies among agricultural exporters,  particularly Argentina and Colombia.
(The Cairns Group's "Vision Statement",  however,  is silent on the subject,  presumably  because of
differences among its members.) Less enthusiasm  is shown by other developing  countries. Many of
them make substantial use of marketing  boards and other state-trading  bodies and are on the defensive
in the working party and in the Committee on Agriculture,  where they argue that such bodies help
stabilize markets and provide food security. In private discussion  with these countries  the subject of
state trading is not raised, but they seem likely to resist any proposals to move in a direction that could
lead to early negotiations.
24 Figure based on table showing use of PSI companies  in New York Journal  of Commerce,
31 December 1997.32
State trading practices  are a major issue in accession negotiations,  where the present WTO members
can, and do, demand that applicants provide specific  undertakings  to ensure that tariff and other
commitments  genuinely lead to market access. However,  there is no link at present between these
negotiations and the review of Article XVII.
12. Rules of Origin
The Agreement on 'Rules  of Origin differed  from most Uruguay  Round agreements  in launching,
rather than concluding, a negotiation. Governments  agreed on a number  of guiding  principles for
rules of origin: that they should  not in themselves  be used as instruments  of trade policy; that they
should be objective,  predictable, coherent and based on positive standards;  and that a particular good
should be held to originate in the country  where it has been wholly obtained or, if more than one
country has been concerned  with its production,  where it was last substantially  performed. But the
central element in the agreement  was the decision to develop  and adopt a single set of harmonized
rules of origin that would  be applied by all WTO members  for all purposes except establishment of
preferential status. This massive task requires that rules be worked out for the entire Harmonized
System tariff classification,  with a rule for every line. The basic work  is being done by the Technical
Committee on Rules of Origin of the World  Customs Organization,  which passes on its conclusions
for each product group to the WTO's  Committee  on Rules of Origin. If the Technical Committee has
not reached consensus  on a rule, it proposes  alternatives  on which the WTO  body can make a decision
on trade policy grounds. Rules of origin can be crucially important in deciding the treatment given to
imports of some products, notably textiles  and clothing, chemicals and machinery,  particularly when
quantitative restrictions, safeguards, or anti-dumping or countervailing  measures are in force. In
consequence,  decisions on the rules can be very sensitive,  and require negotiation.  The work has
fallen well behind schedule. Successive  deadlines  for completion  have been missed. The latest
postponement,  from July 1998 until the Ministerial meeting in late 1999,  raises the strong possibility
that the issue will be caught up in wider negotiations.
There is a broadly  based interest among WTO members  in establishing harmonized rules of origin,
since agreement  would remove from international  trade an important element of uncertainty and a
favoured  instrument for protectionist  action. Developing  countries  recognize  that they could have
large trade interests at stake. This is particularly the case for trade in textiles and clothing, and they
are anxious that restrictive rules of origin should not be used as substitutes  for, or reinforcements  of,
the quantitative restrictions being phased out under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.
As already mentioned, the Agreement on Rules of Origin does not extend to rules which govern
qualification  of goods for preferential  treatment. A "common declaration" attached to the agreement
states that some of the agreement's basic principles, such as clarity, predictability and transparency,
will also be applied to preferential rules of origin. Notably,  however,  the declaration makes no33
promise to apply other principles such as the determination  of origin on the basis of where the last
substantial transformation of a product  was carried out, or the non-use of rules of origin "as
instruments to pursue trade objectives  directly or indirectly". As it stands, therefore,  the agreement
offers no help in curbing  the use of deliberately  trade-distortive  rules (such as NAFTA's "yarn
forward" rule) applied within some regional arrangements.
13. Import licensing
The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures,  which builds on an earlier limited-membership
code, lays down principles and rules to prevent non-automatic  licensing (normally a tool for
administration of quantitative restrictions)  and automatic licensing (used mostly  to establish trade
statistics) from becoming trade barriers in themselves. It is fully in force, and no country  appears to
seek changes in its provisions  that might involve negotiations. The first of its two-yearly reviews,  in
1996, as well as subsequent  reports, show that the main problem encountered  with this
uncontroversial agreement is the same as afflicts the operation of many others: a large proportion of
member countries  do not fulfil their obligations  to notify relevant legislation, procedures  and actions.
14.  Regional Trade Agreements
WTO  Ministers, at their meeting in Singapore  in 1996,  acknowledged  that regional trade agreements
have "expanded vastly in number, scope  and coverage". They also stated that such agreements "can
promote further liberalization  and may assist least-developed,  developing and transition economies  in
integrating into the international trading system". Recently  WTO Director-General  Renato Ruggiero,
who like his immediate predecessors  had previously  taken the optimistic  view of regional agreements
as "building blocks" for wider trade liberalization, has been showing  more concern about their impact
on the multilateral trading system. 25
Article XXIV of the GATT, which sets out the rules for customs  unions or free trade areas, has well-
known areas of ambiguity  which have allowed  large numbers of regional trade areas involving
GATT/WTO  members  to come into existence  even though almost none of the agreements  has been
formally found totally compatible with the rules.  A 1979  Understanding  on Differential and More
Favourable Treatment,  Reciprocity  and Fuller Participation of Developing  Countries (the "Enabling
Clause") provides a further degree of flexibility for agreements  among developing countries, and a
new and so far untested provision in the GATS (Article  V) is the equivalent,  for services,  of GATT
Article XXIV. During the Uruguay Round, a minor interpretative  Understanding  was reached on
Article XXIV. This cleared up a number  of largely technical points. However, it fell far short of the
ambitions of some governments  that are not members  of the major regional agreements, and that
25  Speech in Washington DC on 15 April 1998,  reported in the Financial Times of 16 April.34
believe, in particular, that Article XXIV has been used as cover for discrimination against non-
members  by groupings that do not establish genuinely  free internal trade.
In 1996 a new WTO Committee on Regional  Trade Agreements  was set up to provide a single body to
review new or enlarged arrangements, to improve  examination and reporting procedures, and "to
consider the systemic  implications of the regionalism/multilateralism  relationship". In its first task, it
appears to be a success, except to the extent that progress is held hostage to the disagreements on
systemic  issues, and there is no suggestion  that a change is needed. On reporting procedures, it agreed
in February 1998  on three sets of recommendations,  covering  obligations under GATT Article XXV,
the Enabling Clause and GATS Article V. However,  these recommendations  are regarded by some
countries as less binding than they should  be: the European Union and Canada, in particular, believe
that the provision of trade statistics should  be obligatory  rather than just "desirable".
The discussion of "systemic implications  of the regionalism/multilateralism  relationship" might well
contain the seeds of a future negotiation,  since Ministers agreed in Singapore  that it was important "to
analyze  whether the system  of WTO rights and obligations as it relates to regional trade agreements
needs to be further clarified". The committee  has spent considerable  time on this work during the
past year, and recently launched a work program which covers  legal analysis of the relevant WTO
provisions, comparison of regional trade agreements, and "debate on context and economic  aspects".
The legal analysis has largely focused on two ill-defined  concepts  in Article XXIV: "other regulations
of commerce"  and "substantially  all the trade". The comparison  exercise  will be launched shortly, on
the basis of an inventory,  just completed  by the Secretariat,  of non-tariff provisions of customs  unions
and free trade areas notified  to the WTO. 26 The coverage  of the work  program's "third prong", the
debate on the context and economic  aspects of regional trade agreements,  remains to be seen, but
would presumably  allow discussion  of other matters such as the proliferation of hub-and-spoke
agreements.
A very large proportion of WTO members,  both developed  and developing,  are already members of
regional trade agreements.  Most others seek to establish or further develop  regional links.  Although
these countries  generally endorse the central WTO principle of non-discrimination,  and may even
express concerns  about the impact of regional agreements  on the integrity of the multilateral trading
system, in practice they appear reluctant to tighten the relevant WTO  disciplines. To do so could
reduce the degree  of flexibility that they now enjoy in negotiating  new agreements or else require that
they adjust the terms of agreements  already in force. In the Committee  on Regional Trade
Agreements, the pressure for tighter rules comes  largely from four members: Australia, Hong Kong,
Japan and Korea. No:ne  carries decisive  weight in the WTO, and they have received  little support.
26 WTO document WT/REG/W/26.35
The committee's work program has not, at least so far, broken new ground, and there is speculation
that the exercise is running into the ground. The attitude of the United States and the European
Union will be crucial. So far, they do not appear to have decided what they want. If they were to
decide in favour of strengthened rules, an eventual negotiation  would be likely,  but its value could
well depend on whether they sought to have their own existing agreements  "grandfathered" (i.e.,
exempted from the additional disciplines).  A few  years ago, the United States  could have been
expected  to favour stricter rules - but that was before  it developed  its present enthusiasm for -
establishing free trade areas with other countries in the Americas and beyond. Meanwhile, the EU has
become the centre of a network  of free trade agreements  linking other European countries with it, and
among themselves. (The Secretariat  inventory  just mentioned notes that of 59 free trade area
agreements notified to the GATT and WTO and currently in force, 52 involve  European countries,
and that of these 52,  41 have been signed since 1990.)
One additional factor that may shape the European Union's approach  is its need to replace, by early
2000, its Lome agreement  with the 71 ACP countries. These include the majority of the world's least-
developed  countries as well as nearly thirty further small and vulnerable economies. Virtually all of
them are heavily dependent on trade with the EU. The WTO legal cover for the preferential trade
provisions of the present Lome Convention  takes  the form of a waiver, which requires exceptional
justification, a termination date, annual reviews and either a consensus  decision, or a vote of three-
quarters of the WTO membership,  in favour. Negotiations  on the successor  to Lome will open in
September 1998.  The EU's Council  of Ministers proposes  to replace Lome's trade provisions  with free
trade agreements  that will meet Article  XXIV requirements. A declared aim is that the new
arrangements should leave ACP countries  no worse off than before. To bring a free trade agreement
or agreements  between the ACP countries  and the EU within the terms of Article XXIV's definition
of a free trade area may be thought sufficiently  difficult even under the present rules. The ACP
countries themselves are currently debating whether to seek an easing  of the Article  XV  rules so as
to allow them to adjust more slowly  to free trade, perhaps over 20 years or even more, and to exclude
a wider range of products from liberalization. Most seem to recognize  that they are unlikely to gain
formal changes in the rules, but they hope for some kind of understanding that would allow them the
flexibility they seek. Whether or not they succeed  in these aims, they constitute  a sizeable force, at
least in numbers, that seems certain to be allied with the EU in opposition  to the efforts of Australia,
Hong Kong, Japan and Korea to tighten up Article XXIV's requirements.
15. Intellectual Property
The Agreement on Trade-Related  Aspects  of Intellectual  Property Rights (TRIPS) is an even more
striking departure from the GATT's field of concem than the GATS. When fully in force it will
require each GATT member  to apply minimum standards of protection  for intellectual property
which, in general, exceed the standards set by the Berne and Paris Conventions  and other principal36
international agreements on the subject.  The TRIPS agreement  also sets requirements for enforcement
of this protection  and, as part of the WTO package, is equipped  with binding dispute settlement
procedures. The agreement  constitutes  a complex legal system, whose  provisions  are as yet almost
untested and which, for the trade policy  officials  who operate the other elements  of the WTO system,
is largely unfamiliar territory.
Although the TRIPS obligations are now in full force  for developed  countries, they have barely begun
to bite for developing countries. Developing  countries  in general are already under the obligation  to
provide  MFN treatment and national treatment to other WTO members in their protection of
intellectual property. If they do not provide  patent protection  for pharmaceuticals  or agricultural
chemicals, they must at least allow patent applications to be registered. (India's failure to do this has
led to a formal dispute case.) But most TRIPS rules will not apply to them until 1 January 2000, and
until 1 January 2005 the rules on patents will not apply to products that at present are not patentable.
Countries in transition to a market economy  are also given until 1 January 2000 to come into line with
TRIPS. Least-developed  countries have a still longer transition period, to 1 January 2006, and even
then may be allowed  further time.
These provisions  make TRIPS an outstanding  example  of a subject  on which many developing
countries see no need for early negotiations  that would presumably  extend obligations  under the
agreement still further. In most respects, they are not yet required to assume even the present
obligations, and they anticipate considerable  difficulties  in meeting these obligations on schedule. The
agreement is also one which they accepted  with little enthusiasm.  The energy displayed  by the United
States, in particular, in pursuing dispute  proceedings for perceived  breaches of TRIPS obligations by
other members  can scarcely  encourage them to extend these obligations further. Nor does the manner
in which candidates for WTO membership have come under pressure from all the major developed
countries  to accept  and enforce the full TRIPS disciplines  with effect from their date of accession,
without the benefit of any transition periods.
Nevertheless,  there is already a heavy current programme of work under the TRIPS agreement,
including some negotiations  on specific issues. The TRIPS Council  is just finishing a detailed review
of the intellectual property legislation  of developed  countries. This has taken two years, and will be
followed  in due course by similar review  of other countries' legislation, once the January 2000
deadline has passed. Negotiations  are required, and will start very soon, on a notification and
registration system  for geographical  indications  for wines, and may be extended to spirits. A separate
review of  experience  with TRIPS provisions  meant to protect geographical  indications  for other
products is under way, and has the potential to lead to further negotiations. Several developing
countries have an interest in the protection of traditional names of their agricultural and other
products, as an important marketing tool. Among examples  cited as threatened are basmati rice
(Pakistan and India) and tequila (Mexico). Starting in 1999,  there will be a review of the TRIPS37
provision (Article 27:3(b))  that allows countries  to exclude  plants, animals and biotechnological
processes for producing  plants and animals from patentability  , but also requires some form of
protection  for plant varieties. An extremely  sensitive subject,  especially  for environmental  groups
("No patents on life"), this TRIPS provision  has also become  a political  issue in India, and along with
the question of pharmaceutical  patents has threatened acceptance  of the TRIPS agreement  by the
Indian legislature. However,  there are suggestions  that developing  countries  might gain advantage in
an eventual negotiated  bargain emerging  from the review  of 27:3(b): a counterpart  to any increase in
patent protection  for plants and animals could  be similar protection  of indigenous  knowledge. Several
other TRIPS issues  may require negotiations. Among  them is the question, left open in the Uruguay
Round, of  what protection  should  be given against "parallel" imports  of a genuine product  which has
not been licensed  for sale in the importing country. Any or all of these matters might still be
unresolved  by January 2000, when a first general review  of implementation  of the TRIPS agreement
will become due, opening up the possibility  of wider negotiations  on intellectual property issues
simultaneously  with the scheduled  negotiations  on agriculture  and services.
16. Govermment  Procurement
Work in the WTO on government  procurement  is proceeding  on three separate  tracks. Whether they
will converge,  and even  join together, remains to be seen. The first track is the Agreement on
Government  Procurement (GPA).  The second,  in the Working  Party on GATS  Rules, has already
been discussed,  above, in the context of prospective  negotiations  on services. The third is a study of
transparency in government  procurement  practices,  launched by the 1996 WTO  Ministerial meeting.
The GPA is one of the two surviving  "plurilateral  agreements"  (the other concerns  trade in civil
aircraft) which, although attached to the WTO, bind only those countries  which have signed them.
Its membership 27 consists  largely  of developed  countries. Based on an earlier GATT  code, it was
greatly expanded in coverage,  though not in membership,  during negotiations  that ran in parallel with
the Uruguay  Round. Government  procurement  is not covered  by the GATT and GATS,  since
purchases by governments  for their own use are excluded  from the general rules of national treatment
and of non-discrimination  by state-trading  enterprises.  The GPA opens up, for the benefit only of its
signatories, the possibility  of tendering for the purchase  orders of specified  central and sub-central
government  bodies, public utilities and other services. In structure, it resembles  the GATS,  with a set
of rules whose  practical significance  depends on the commitments  of individual signatories. Its rules
govern such matters as tendering procedures,  the publication  of awards,  and the threshold levels
above  which purchases must be open to competition  from other signatories.  Members' commitments
are set out in appendices  which list the purchasing  entities covered,  and also, in many cases,
27 As of May 1998:  Canada; the European Community  and its 15 member states;  Hong Kong, China;
Israel; Japan; Republic of Korea; Liechtenstein;  Netherlands (for Aruba); Norway; Singapore;
Switzerland;  United States.38
specifically  disallow the benefits of the agreement  to some signatories  judged not to have offered
corresponding  access  to their own government  procurement  markets.
The GPA includes provisions  meant to increase  its attraction  to developing  countries. For example,
they can negotiate  the right to impose  conditions  such as domestic  purchase  requirements  on foreign
tenders for government  procurement. Nevertheless,  few developing  countries have shown much
interest. Hong Kong signed the original code, but accepted  the current agreement  only after some
delay, having previously  expressed  distaste for its discriminatory  aspects. Mexico and Chile,
countries whose  economic  policies make them basically  sympathetic  to the aims of the GPA, have
stayed outside. Both have expressed  their judgement of the agreement  in recent trade policy reviews.
Chile describes it as "complex,  bureaucratic and costly", and dislikes  its failure to provide  full MFN
treatment; Mexico  finds it too limited in membership. 28 Nevertheless,  both show interest in joining
the GPA eventually.  Membership  will increase  in the coming years, if only  because  countries
negotiating their accession to the WTO  are routinely asked  by the major developed  members  to
commit  themselves also to negotiate  accession  to the GPA, and several have already done so.  The
signatories are themselves committed  to undertake negotiations,  not later than the end of 1998  and
periodically  thereafter, to improve and widen the agreement  and to eliminate discriminatory  measures
and practices. A review process  to prepare  for the negotiations  is under way. Among its agreed
objectives  is expansion  of the membership  of the GPA by making it more attractive to other countries.
The signatories have invited  WTO members  and candidates  for accession  to take part as observers in
meetings of the Committee  on Government  Procurement.
The issue of transparency  in government  procurement  practices  was  placed on the WTO agenda by a
decision in Singapore  which established  a working  party to study  the issue,  "taking into account
national policies", and to "develop  elements  for inclusion  in an appropriate  agreement". The mention
of an agreement  makes it clear that negotiations  will take place. The working group is making quite
good progress in identifying  key elements  for an agreement, such as full information on national
legislation and procedures,  as well as on procurement  opportunities,  tendering and qualification;
transparency of decisions  on qualification  and contract awards; and review  of complaints  by suppliers.
Provided the work  does not go beyond  transparency,  and thus does not attempt  to align or liberalize
national procurement  policies, many developing  countries  are ready to support it, recognizing  that it
might save  money, contribute  to good  governance,  and even open up export opportunities. Some
developed  countries  hope a transparency agreement  might one day be merged with the GPA itself, so
that the GPA  became a fully multilateral agreement  like others in the WTO package. Others think this
unlikely.
(c) Subjects covered by later WTO decisions
28 Minutes of TPRB reviews of Chile (WT/TPR/M/28)  and Mexico  (WT/TPR/M/29)39
Work is currently under way in the WTO on four subjects  - trade and enviromnent,  trade and
investment, trade and competition,  and trade facilitation -- that are not covered  at present by
substantive  rules. A decision has just been made to examine  a fifth subject,  electronic commerce. All
five could be taken up in future multilateral negotiations.
1.  Trade and environment
The WTO Committee  on Trade and Environment has a mandate, most recently renewed  by Ministers
in Singapore, "to identify  the relationship  between trade measures and enviromnental measures in
order to promote sustainable  development"  and "to make appropriate recommendations  on whether
any modifications  of the provisions  of the multilateral  trading system  are required, compatible with
the open, equitable and non-discriminatory  nature of the system". Work on environmental issues in
fact began more than five years ago in the GATT, sparked  by disputes concerning  trade-related
measures taken by governments  for environmental  purposes.  The most celebrated  of these concerned a
complaint by Mexico against the United States  in the early 1990's concerning the latter's ban on
imports of tuna caught by fishing methods  which endangered dolphin. The GATT panel's ruling in
favour of Mexico  infuriated environmentalists, many of whom decided  that GATT rules and the
prospective  outcome of the Uruguay  Round were an obstacle  to saving the planet. For their part,
developing countries  were generally dismayed  by the degree of governmental  support won in North
America and Europe by environmental  arguments, which they saw as an all too convenient cloak for
protectionist interests.
The discussion  launched in the GATT and carried forward in the WTO has been primarily an effort to
foster a degree of mutual understanding of the issues, and incidentally  to lower  the temperature of the
debate, both between governments  and between environmentalists  (largely represented  by non-
governmental  activists) and the WTO. It has had some success, at least as far as concerns  member
governments  of the WTO. Two issues have emerged as clearly relevant to the WTO rules: the
relationship between the WTO and the provisions  of multilateral environmental  agreements (MEAs),
and the fact that environmental  objectives  are frequently  sought through the establishment of
technical standards, packaging and labelling requirements,  as well as sanitary and phytosanitary
restrictions. On MEAs, such as those concerned  with phase-out of CFCs and protection of
endangered species, there is a clear, and largely  North-South,  division of view. Most developed
countries  want prior assurance that action taken under the terms of an MEA cannot be challenged in
the WTO. The European Union,  in particular, proposes  that such action should  be recognized  as
covered  by GATT Article XX(b),  which allows measures "necessary  to protect human, animal or
plant life or health", provided  they are not used to discriminate unfairly  between countries  or as a
disguised restriction  on trade. Developing  countries in general wish to retain some possibility  of
WTO challenge of actions taken under an MEA. They are not fully reassured by evidence  that most40
M:EAs  do not have trade provisions, or that no WTO disputes have yet arisen over actions under an
MEA.  As regards standards-related  environmental measures,  a central problem, in the view of many
developing countries, is that in many cases these aim to enforce requirements  that do not concern the
product itself,  but rather the way in which it is produced,  this being seen by them as an unacceptable
effort to extend the jurisdiction of the country applying  the measure beyond its borders. Beyond these
issues, the discussion  has included some discussion  of how improved WTO disciplines might help to
further environmental  objectives. Agricultural  exporters such as Argentina and New Zealand point,
for example, to the role of subsidies  in encouraging  pollution through excessive  use of chemicals on
crops, as well as in depletion of fish stocks  through overfishing.
Although developing countries  have not spoken with one voice in the committee,  their views are quite
closely aligned. They  see no prospective  gains, and considerable  risks, for themselves  from any WTO
negotiations on environmental  issues. They accept  that work in the committee  has led to a better
understanding of the relationship between  trade and environmental  issues, but do not believe that it
has demonstrated a need to change any WTO rules. Some  insist that if intergovernmental agreement
is needed on substantive matters, this should be sought directly  through MEAs and in bodies such as
the International Organization for Standardization  which have the necessary specialized  knowledge.
The point is also made that if the WTO  were to become  involved in setting environmental standards,
it would not only go beyond its area of expertise  but would also  justify accusations  in some developed
countries that it is a supranational monster. These views have some support even among developed
countries. Nevertheless,  most WTO members  seem to expect  continuing pressure, particularly from
the United States but also from Europe, to include environmental  issues in future WTO negotiations.
EU Commissio:ner  Sir Leon Brittan has proposed a high-level meeting of trade and environment
policymakers  later this year in Geneva, as a means of breaking out of what is now widely seen as a
stalemate in the WTO committee.  President Clinton has endorsed this proposal, and reaffirmed the
US view that "international trade rules must permit sovereign  nations to exercise their right to set
protective standards for health, safety  and the environment  and biodiversity ... even when [the
standards) are stronger  than environmental  norms".29
2.  Trade and investment
With the exception  of labour standards, the most controversial  question at the 1996  meeting of WTO
Ministers was whether the WTO should  concern itself with investment  issues.  Controversy  was
particularly acute because  developing countries  were themselves divided over the question. The
outcome was a decision, carefully  balanced and linked with the launch of related work on competition
issues, to establish a working group "to examine the relationship  between trade and investment", with
the explicit understanding that "work  undertaken shall not prejudge  whether negotiations  will be
29 Statement to V/TO Ministers, Geneva, 18 May 199841
initiated in the future".  The WTO Council  is to determine  after two years -i.e., in 1999--  how work
should proceed, subject again to an understanding that any decision to negotiate  new multilateral
disciplines would have to be taken by explicit consensus  decision. A widely held expectation  is that
such a decision would most probably  be made in the context of broader  debate on whether to launch a
major round of negotiations  in the WTO.
The working group has agreed to discuss a long list of issues grouped  under three headings: the
implications of the relationship between  trade and investment  for development  and economic growth;
the economic relationship  between trade and investment;  and a stocktaking and analysis of relevant
existing international instruments and activities.  Drawing on this work, it is to compare existing
instruments, identifying  possible  conflicts and gaps between them; consider  advantages and
disadvantages of bilateral, regional and multilateral rules on investment, including from a
development  perspective;  consider the rights and obligations of home and host countries  and of
investors and host countries; and finally consider  the relationship  between whatever cooperation
might be undertaken on investment  policy and cooperation  on competition  policy. Although the
discussion  has far to go, most participants  feel that it is progressing  well, with many good papers
submitted  by delegations, and an interesting exchange of experience  and views.
So far, there is no sign that government  attitudes to a possible  WTO agreement on investment are
shifting. The initiative for action in the WTO came from a group led by Canada and also including
Japan, Morocco and Peru. The strongest resistance was expressed  by Malaysia, Indonesia  and India.
A major complicating factor has been the US preference  for the efforts in the OECD to develop a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).  Drafting of the MAI was already well advanced  when
the WTO working group was set up. In the event, agreement  was not reached, as had been expected,
in May 1997; renewed  efforts to reach agreement  by May 1998  also failed; and it seems an open
question  whether or not the MAI negotiations are now effectively  dead.  The differences  between the
United States and other OECD members  that have prevented agreement  on the MAI are in fact all
familiar also in the WTO: the desire to limit extraterritorial action such as required by the Helms-
Burton and d'Amato Acts, French demands for a "cultural" exception, a major issue in the Uruguay
Round negotiations  on services,  and whether labour  and environmental  considerations  should  be
included. As long as an early agreement  on the MAI has been in prospect, the United States and
other countries which favour strong provisions  to encourage  investment  flows have had little incentive
to pursue an agreement in the WTO that would be likely, from their point of view, to be significantly
weaker, since it would have to accommodate  the views of the rest of the WTO's membership. They
have been encouraged in this by the declared interest of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong and
Hungary in signing the MAI. Views  on what may happen if the MAI is shelved indefinitely  differ
sharply. Some  foresee a general loss of interest in developing  multilateral rules for investment, and
perhaps a shift of focus  towards formulating non-binding  principles in the context of regional
agreements such as APEC. Others, including several OECD members, believe and hope that new life42
may be breathed into the WTO process, helped  by the greater legitimacy that could be claimed  for a
multilateral intvestment  agreement shaped  by the efforts of a wider and more representative  group
than the OECD.
Developing-country  views on the desirability of WTO  rules on investment  vary widely, even though,
as many point out, almost all of them now seek to attract foreign investors. At one extreme, Malaysia
and some others take positions which (in the words of a developing-country  representative)  are shaped
essentially by ideology:  for them, it is a matter of national sovereignty  to be able to attract, and choose
between, foreign investments  in the light of their judgement of the country's priority needs. Malaysia
argues that bilateral investment  treaties, of which it has nearly 60, are sufficient  to protect and
promote investment. Other countries are not opposed in principle to a multilateral investment
agreement, but say they have yet to be convinced  that one is needed. They feel a practical need to
retain some policy flexibility so that they can encourage investment  in particular regions or continue
to favour local firms or local participation. Their arguments are similar to those deployed  to prevent a
broad TRIMs agreement  from emerging  from the Uruguay  Round.  They  also argue that the United
States expects IvIFN  and national treatment  for its foreign investors,  and that the European Union
expects other countries  to forswear any policy direction  of investment, but that neither appears  to
contemplate  any counterpart obligation. (China is seen as a potential key member of this group,
following its accession  to the WTO, unless it accepts constraints on its investment policies in the
context of the accession  process.) At the other end of the scale, Latin American countries, Hong
Kong and Korea are strongly interested in subscribing  to a multilateral investment  agreement,
primarily as a means of attracting foreign investors. Africa is simply not present in the debate.
Virtually nothing has yet been said about possible  provisions of a WTO investment agreement. A
common assumption is that it would necessarily  be less ambitious  than the draft MAI, which has been
under negotiation essentially  among developed  countries. One line of thought, responding to the view
that source nations should accept counterpart  obligations to those expected  of host countries,
envisages commitments  to encourage outflows  - but recognizes  that this may be impracticable in the
face of growing public hostility in some developed  countries  to outward  investment.
3.  Trade and competition
Trade and competition  was placed on the WTO  agenda in conjunction  with trade and investment. As
with investment, the subject is to be studied in a working group up to the end of 1998,  with a decision
in 1999  by the General Council  on how to proceed further, and with an understanding  that any
negotiations will take place only after an explicit consensus  decision by WTO members.
The group is working on lines similar to those adopted  by the group on trade and investment. Under
a first main heading, it is  discussing  the relationship between  the objectives,  principles, scope and43
instruments  of trade and competition  policy,  and the relationship of trade and competition  policy to
development  and economic  growth. Second,  it is reviewing  the content and application of national
competition  policies and laws related to trade, relevant WTO  provisions, and international  agreements
and initiatives. Third, it is looking at the interaction of trade and competition  policy,  including the
impact of anti-competitive  practices of enterprises and associations  on international trade, the trade
impact of state monopolies  and regulatory  policies,  the relationship of intellectual property  rights and
of investment  with competition  policy,  and the impact of trade policy on competition.  Finally, it will
identify "any areas that merit consideration  in the WTO framework". As in the case of investment,
participants in the working party have produced a large volume of papers and statements. However,
there appears  to be a widespread  view that the issues involved  are more complex,  and less well
understood, than in the case of investment, and that in consequence  a long process of mutual
education may be nceded before many countries will feel able  to subscribe  to any conclusions.
The prime mover and continuing enthusiast for involving the WTO in competition issues is the
European Union, but it has considerable  developing-country  support. The United States is a reluctant
participant, willing to join in a study  program, but at present clearly sceptical  that WTO negotiations
on competition  rules are desirable.  It doubts  that there is  sufficient  agreement among WTO members
on basic goals for competition  policy,  or sufficient  practical experience of anti-trust matters in most
countries, to build a useful multilateral agreement. Sir Leon  Brittan, the European Commissioner  for
External Trade, argues that companies  will be increasingly  tempted to resort to anti-competitive
actions as tariff and other protection  is reduced. He has spelled out ideas for such an agreement,
which could in his view include a commitment  by WTO members  to enact effective  domestic
competition  legislation, guaranteed  access  to national courts without discrimination  between domestic
and foreign firms, and basic standards of enforcement  such as transparency of proceedings, the
application of sanctions, and an effective  competition  authority. 30
Developing  countries  tend to be attracted by the idea of cooperation  to deal with abuses  by
multinational companies, a theme they have pursued for many years in the context of the United
Nations. Some (notably Hong Kong) argue that mutually  consistent trade and competition  policies,
including  the incorporation of additional competition  concepts into the WTO system, could reduce the
need for government trade measures  that discriminate against competitive  suppliers, and in particular
for anti-dumping action. 3'  (Not all developing  countries  agree with Hong Kong's approach: one
argues privately  that insistence on prior agreement  to review  the WTO anti-dumping rules could block
30  Speech  in Washington DC on 20 November 1997  (European  Report, 22 November 1997). Similar
arguments were set out by Mr Karel Van Miert, the EU Commissioner  for competition  issues, in a
speech in Geneva on 21 April  1998 (Agence France Presse,  21 April, and Wall Street Journal,  22
April).
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the possibility of negotiations  on competition.)  Those Latin American countries  which are ready to
subscribe  to commitments on investment tend also to favour negotiations on competition  issues.
Other developing countries, however,  conscious  that they have no competition  legislation of their own
or that what they have goes unenforced, are hesitant.
Whatever  their views, developing  countries  tend to agree that broad-ranging WTO negotiations on
competition  are unlikely within the near future. They believe  it will take some years, at best, to
establish sufficient  common ground for fruitful negotiations. Some suggest,  however,  that it might be
possible to tak:e  up one or two well-defined  issues, perhaps in the context of the review of the TRIMS
agreement in 1999.
4.  Trade facilitation
Unlike the three preceding subjects,  trade facilitation is essentially  uncontroversial. It too was added
to the WTO work  program by a Ministerial decision in Singapore  that was adopted as the result of an
initiative  by the European Union. The WTO's Goods Council  is required "to undertake exploratory
and analytical work, drawing on the work of other relevant international organizations, on the
simplification  of trade procedures  in order to assess the scope  for WTO rules in this area".  The final
phrase clearly foreshadows  negotiations  on the subject.
The essence  of the EU proposal is that the WTO should explore the possibility  of developing rules that
would give teeth to the efforts of a number of organizations  to reduce  practical problems encountered
by international traders, particularly in completing  formalities at the border. The key agreement  in
this respect is the Kyoto Convention  of 1973,  administered  by the World Customs  Organization. The
Convention  has some 55 signatories,  but each has accepted  only a few of the 30 annexes that set out
substantive  obligations. The other main relevant organizations  are UNCTAD, ECE, APEC and the
International Chamber of Commerce. So  far, work in the WTO has not gone beyond assembling
information 32 about the efforts of these organizations  to simplify trade procedures, and holding a
symposium  on the subject in March 1998 which demonstrated  the keen practical interest of the
business community. The European Union has recently developed  its ideas, proposing that the WTO
could develop  a legal instrument that would bind members  to adopt a central core of the more widely
accepted international agreements  on trade facilitation, and particularly a revised  version of the Kyoto
Convention. The EU also suggests  efforts to establish  the data requirements for a single document in
electronic format that would permit customs  procedures  worldwide  to be streamlined.
Most countries are ready to explore the implications of the EU proposal, although (in the words of one
developing-country  delegate)  "there are quite a few sceptics". The United States has been
32 WTO document G/C/W/80.45
unenthusiastic, arguing that the WTO has enough of its own to do in related areas such as rules of
origin, preshipment inspection and helping developing  countries to adapt to the customs  valuation
agreement. However,  it has acknowledged,  following  the March symposium,  the support shown by
private business for WTO involvement  in the subject.
5.  Electronic commerce
This is a brand new subject for the WTO, and little can be said about it. It was first raised by the
United States in the WTO Council in February 1998,  as a proposal that member countries  should
undertake to continue the present practice  under which none of them imposes  customs duties on
electronic transmissions. The United States argued that electronic commerce  was growing
dynamically,  and that the WTO should demonstrate  support for its continuing expansion; that no
precedent would be set for taxation or regulation  in the sector;  and that the proposal would simply
codify  present practice and provide a starting point for WTO study  of other aspects  of electronic
commerce. It was emphasized  that the proposal would not apply to goods  imported through normal
commercial channels, even if these were ordered over  the Internet or by other electronic means.
Other WTO members agreed that electronic commerce  was a subject  of importance, but were unready
to pledge themselves never to impose import duties on it, particularly without studying the possible
fiscal and revenue implications of such self-denial. As a result of continuing US pressure, WTO
Ministers fornally agreed in May 199833  that the organization should study  "all trade-related  issues
relating to global electronic commerce",  taking into account the economic,  financial and development
needs of developing  countries, and draw up recommendations  for the next Ministerial Conference.
This means that the results of the study will inevitably  be an input into the broader decision by
Ministers in 1999 on whether to launch broad-ranging  new negotiations. At least until the 1999
meeting, WTO members have agreed not to introduce  customs  duties on electronic  transmissions.
Any extension of this decision will require a consensus  decision.
Only the US government seems,  as yet, to have taken a firm position on the subject.  When the subject
was first broached, Egypt, India, Nigeria and Pakistan raised a number  of questions and objections,
including the risk of discrimination  in favour of electronic commerce  over traditional forms of trade,
potential loss of  government  revenue, and the particular issue of sound recordings. In general,
however, developing-country  views have not evolved  far beyond reluctance  to close  off definitively  a
possibly lucrative source of income, and a degree of irritation with the United States for forcing an
inadequately-considered  decision in the WTO.46
(d) Labour standards
The subject of labour  standards is not, for the present at least, on the WTO's agenda, but is very much
in the minds of the organization's member  governments.
An effort was made in December 1996 by the United States and France, with Norwegian support,  to
secure inclusion in the Singapore  Ministerial declaration  of a commitment  to core labour standards.
This was strongly opposed  by developing  countries, led by Malaysia,  India, Pakistan and Egypt. The
negotiated  outcome was a text that expresses support for observance  of "internationally recognized
core labour standards" and identifies the International Labour Organization as the competent  body to
set and deal with these standards. The statement goes on to reject the use of labour  standards for
protectionist  purposes, and to "agree that the comparative advantage  of countries, particularly low-
wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question". In addition, a negotiated
interpretative statement read out by the chairman of the Singapore  meeting stated explicitly that the
issue of labour standards was not on the WTO's agenda, that no new work on the subject  in the WTO
had been organized, and that the WTO had no competence  in the matter.
Since the meeting, there has been no discussion  of the issue in the WTO. Within the ILO, however,
difficult negotiations  led to agreement, at the organization's annual conference  in June 1998,  on  a
"Declaration on Fundamental Workers' Rights" which in its trade aspects essentially  says much the
same as the Singapore  text. Any effort by the United States or others to raise the issue again in the
WTO would undoubtedly  be resisted  very strongly  by developing  countries: one delegate active in
efforts to coordinate  their positions in the WTO believes  that it could result in a breakdown in
relations. President Clinton was evidently  aware of these views in his comments  on the subject in his
speech to WTO Ministers in May 1998.  Although  he called on the WTO  and the ILO to "commit to
work together, to make certain that open trade lifts living conditions, and respects  the core labour
standards that are essential not only to workers rights but to human rights everywhere",  and asked the
two organizations' secretariats to discuss  the issues  together, he spoke of concrete action only in the
context of the Il.O.
III: TOWARDS  A NEW ROUND ?
The preceding section has surveyed some  two dozen possible  subjects for future WTO negotiations.
With a slightly clifferent  categorization,  with a separate  review of some cross-cutting  issues such as
the treatment of least-developed  countries, and with a little further help from governments  (the United
States raised the question of electronic commerce  in the WTO while this paper was in preparation) the
33 Declaration on Global  Electronic Commerce,  May 20,1998. The WTO Secretariat  has provided a
survey  of issues involved  in Electronic Commerce and the Role of the WTO (Geneva, WTO, 1998)47
figure could reach 30 or more. But does this long list of issues add up to the likelihood  of a new
negotiating round in the WTO?
A strong hint at the answer has just been provided  by the May 1998  declaration of WTO Ministers.
This has undoubtedly  made wide-ranging negotiations  more likely. The WTO's General Council is
now charged with drawing up a work programme that can extend to all the subjects surveyed  in this
paper; all member countries have consented  to this work; the Council's recommendations  are to
include "further liberalization sufficiently  broad-based  to respond to the range of interests and
concerns of all Members"; and  the work programme is to "be aimed at achieving overall  balance of
interests of all Members" . The United States, an essential participant in any major GATT or WTO
round, has shifted position towards support of new negotiations. However,  eventual agreement on
recommendations  on a work programme is explicitly subject  to the condition of consensus  agreement
among WTO members, a condition  without which many developing countries  would not have signed
up to the declaration; the words "round" and "single undertaking" are nowhere to be found in the text;
and the United States has obvious  misgivings  about engaging in another full-scale round, and still
has no negotiating authority from the Congress.
A clearer response  may perhaps best be sought in a review  both of the issues  themselves and of the
views of individual governments.
The potential issues for negotiation comprise  every subject  discussed in the Uruguay  Round, plus one
(government procurement)  that was discussed  only among a limited number of governments, and half
a dozen more (environment, investment, competition,  trade facilitation, electronic commerce  and
labour standards) that have surfaced  since. However,  the preceding issue-by-issue  review suggests
that some are not likely  to figure in even a full-scale new WTO round, and that others would probably
do so only marginally.
There are only two major certainties: agriculture and services.  It is widely thought that a negotiation
confined to agriculture would not get far, since it would provide  little opportunity  for balanced give-
and-take. This provides an incentive, from the point of view of both developed  and developing
exporters of agricultural products, for taking up other subjects  at the same  time.  Services  negotiations
are perhaps potentially  more balanced among the developed  countries, but many developing countries
see little to gain.  On both subjects,  a preparatory  process for the negotiations  is now under way.
Two other subjects  - tariff negotiations  and government  procurement  - appear near-certainties, if a
broad WTO negotiation is launched. Further tariff liberalization  could help to create a balance of
interests. The scope  for sweeping  tariff cuts is not what it was, particularly after the cherry-picking
sectoral exercises of the last few  years, and remaining tariff peaks tend to be concentrated  in the
difficult trade sectors  of agriculture and food, textiles and clothing. Nevertheless,  most countries can48
still identify areas in which tariff reductions  in export markets  would be helpful. Many developing
countries possess  useful negotiating coin, which could buy advantages  in other areas of a broad
negotiation, in the scope  they have to bind their own tariffs at levels nearer to those they actually
apply. This is familiar territory  for WTO negotiators,  who should be able to make the necessary
technical preparations fairly quickly.  The signatories of the government  procurement  agreement are
pledged, and generally keen, to negotiate  among themselves,  and may be prepared to make interesting
concessions  on other subjects  to tempt a few more developing  countries into their club. They  too are
preparing to negotiate quite soon.
Beyond  these four subjects,  it is harder to discern the ingredients of a new round. Under the Uruguay
Round's built-in agenda, there are negotiations  or reviews  to come on a wide range of subjects.  Some,
however, are essentially  uncontroversial or self-contained. Others might be caught up in a new round
if  full agreement  could not be reached independently  (the current negotiations  on rules of origin are
an example), or if the prospect  of a broader negotiation,  with the potential for give-and-take  between
different sectors, encouraged a higher level of ambition. This might apply to TRIPS, subsidies, the
SPS agreement and state trading.  Any negotiations on dispute settlement,  technical barriers to trade,
anti-dumping, preshipment inspection,  and the rules for regional trade agreements seem  likely to be
unambitious. No one, apparently, seeks  to open up the WTO agreement itself,  the trade policy
reviews,  or-the existing rules on TRIMS, safeguards,  customs  valuation or import licensing. Of the
subjects  taken up in Singapore,  transparency in government  procurement,  and also trade facilitation,
seem relatively  uncontroversial  and straightforward.  Both could be taken up for negotiation as
independent subjects,  or included in a new round. Investment  and competition  policy need much
more work in the WTO before negotiations  would  be possible:  of the two, investment seems the more
credible candidate for negotiation  both because  the issues appear clearer and because  a wider range of
key countries is interested. Not much seems likely to happen on trade and environment,  unless
developed countries  press very hard.  Of the other subjects  discussed,  electronic commerce  might well
make it into a new  round in some form. The inclusion of labour standards  would be resisted  by all
developing countries and most developed  countries  too, but could figure nevertheless (along with
environmental issues and the question of institutional  transparency) in any negotiating mandate given
to the US Administration.
In summary, there is clearly subject-matter  available for a major negotiating round from 2000
onwards, if WTFO  members  decide to bring together in a single enterprise the major tasks to which
they are already committed. However,  even with the addition of investment, or of other issues now
under study in the WTO, a new round would  be unlikely  to rival in significance  the Uruguay Round,
which made funidamental  changes in the rules and institutions of the multilateral trading system.
(Fortunately, it would be unlikely also to rival the Uruguay Round in length or in the effort and
commitment required to bring it to success.)  Equally clearly, there is no certainty that a new round
will take place. The only broad negotiations  definitely scheduled  are those on agriculture and services49
from 1999/2000. Even these negotiations  might not amount to much. It should be remembered  that
they are only the first instalment of longer-term  programmes of agricultural reform and services
liberalization to which WTO members  are committed. The near-certainty  that further rounds of
negotiations would take place on both subjects might make  participants willing to accept  a limited
outcome, particularly if leading participants  had no authority to negotiate  significant liberalization.
The issue of negotiating authority may be crucial to prospects  for negotiations  in the WTO. No one
doubts that effective  participation  by the United States is essential to the success  of any broad-ranging
WTO negotiation. Until the US Administration  is armed with fast-track negotiating authority, which
provides essential reassurance  that any agreements  reached in Geneva  will not be reopened  by the
Congress, America's negotiating partners are most unlikely to enter into serious bargaining on a
package of politically  sensitive and complex  issues. The present situation, in which the
Administration has withdrawn a first request  for fast-track  because  of Congressional  hostility  but
promises to try again, creates a great deal of uncertainty.
With or without  fast-track, the attitude of the United States  towards a new multi-subject  negotiation
remains ambiguous. It has successfully  championed recent sectoral  negotiations in the WTO, taking a
hard and ultimately successful  line in the services negotiations  on basic telecoms  and financial
services,  winning rapid agreement on the Information  Technology  Agreement,  and pushing for an
extension of the ITA's coverage.  President Clinton's May 1998 speech to WTO Ministers showed  a
continuing faith in the sectoral approach, particularly to the dismantling of tariffs, as well as
impatience  with the hallowed  GATT principle of the "single undertaking" ("waiting for every issue in
every sector to be resolved  before any issue in any sector is resolved"). The United States is using the
leverage provided  by negotiations on the accession  of new members  to the WTO to ensure that these
countries, including China and Russia, accept much broader market-opening  commitments than have
been accepted  by most developing countries. As far as concerns  the WTO rules, the United States
appears largely content with the texts of the present agreements, and gives priority to ensuring that
other WTO members  bring them into effect fully, and on schedule. Outside the context of the WTO, it
is engaged in several regional initiatives, notably in APEC, where it is again favouring a sectoral
approach. In spite of all this, there are good reasons for the United States to favour,  and even provide
leadership for, a new WTO round. The suspension  of the ITA 2 negotiations, and difficulties  in
following  through on earlier APEC decisions,  suggest  that the scope  for further sectoral negotiations
may be limited. The coming agriculture and services negotiations  play to American strengths,  but may
not prove productive  unless linked with other subjects  that will allow some degree of give and take.
Among other possible  subjects for negotiations  are several in which the United States has a strong
positive interest: market access, government  procurement,  state trading, investment, intellectual
property and environmental  issues.50
Members of the European Union, the other centrally important player in any WTO round, have now
given their support to Sir Leon Brittan, who has taken the lead in calling for a Millenium Round in
the WTO. The EU shares many of the interests of the United States, but will be on the defensive in the
agricultural negotiations, and preoccupied  with what are bound to be long drawn-out negotiations  on
its own enlargement. This declaration of principle  is important,  but internal discussion  of what the
EU would seek in a new round, has not really  begun.
The other developed  countries  also tend to share interests with the US and EU. Those that are
members  of the Cairns Group (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) recognize  that the coming
negotiations on agriculture are likely to be more  fruitful if included in a broader package. Australia
and New Zeailand  are firm partisans of a new  round. Canada is doubtful, and is proposing what it calls
a "cluster approach" , in which issues would be grouped  together for negotiation  as distinct packages
and at different times.  (The United States has shown some  interest in this idea.)  Most of the
remaining developed  countries, generally  traditional supporters  of open market and a multilateral
approach  to trade problems, have also in recent months declared  their support in principle for new
negotiations,.
Although manay  transition economies  are negotiating  for WTO membership,  comparatively  few are
already members, and thus in a position to influence debate on a new round. Most are expected  to
take their cue from the European Union.
Among developing  countries, present views on possible new negotiations  range from almost entirely
negative to enthusiastic,  with the majority somewhere  in between,  but still on balance  probably more
negative than positive. Most WTO delegates,  however,  have been stressing for some time that their
governments  have yet to take a firm position, and will do so only when the major developed countries
show their hands. Statements  of some developing-country  representatives  at the May 1998 WTO
Ministerial meeting seemed  to reflect and follow the perceptible shift of the developed  countries
towards support of new negotiations.
The argument most commonly  advanced  by developing countries  against new negotiations is that they
still face a huge task in bringing their trade policies into line with the requirements of the Uruguay
Round agreements. Negotiations starting around 2000 would come  before  the end of the transitional
periods granted to them under several agreements,  and long before  they expect to become accustomed
to applying the new rules. They can fairly point out that, in such areas as intellectual property,
technical standards and customs  valuation, the practices of most developed  countries were already
close  to those prescribed  by these rules. Many developing countries  are by comparison  starting almost
from scratch: they need to introduce new laws and new administrative  measures, and to reinforce their
administrative and judicial capacity  to apply them. India and Egypt, both prominent voices in the
WTO as they were in the GATT, are among the countries  which argue most strongly  that acceptance51
of the Uruguay  Round results represented  an unprecedented  level of commitment,  that they need time
to absorb the consequences  for both bureaucratic and political reasons, and that in these circumstances
it would be counterproductive  to rush into another round of negotiations. They find support among
the least-developed  countries, and also in Asia, especially  in ASEAN. Brazil has taken a similar line,
although its position is now that it supports new negotiations, as long as these do "not take place
before the commitments undertaken in the Uruguay  Round are implemented, so as not to upset the
balance of the concessions  agreed  to at that time. 34
Even these countries, however, acknowledge  that there could be positive  aspects to a new round.
Those who are agricultural exporters (and four ASEAN countries, and Brazil, are in the Cairns
Group) recognize the arguments for a broader  negotiation,  with enough other elements  to make
constructive  trade-offs  possible. Others see scope  for special and differential treatment of developing
countries in the agricultural negotiations,  including further action to avoid damage to the net food
importing countries. Many countries  would  join with interest, though perhaps not much optimism, in
market access negotiations  aimed at cutting tariff peaks and tariff escalation  affecting  textiles,
clothing, shoes and other products of developing countries, and in negotiations  on services if these
held promise of easing movement  of natural persons (Mode  4).  If negotiations  extended to review of
WTO rules, this would provide  the opportunity  for India to enlist support for its view that "some of
the agreements  contain certain inequities  which were not foreseen" and that these "should be looked
into and necessary  amendments  carried out" 35.
The strongest developing-country  support comes  from Latin America (notably  from Argentina,
Colombia and Mexico)  and from Hong Kong.  These countries  argue for a new round of multilateral
negotiations for a variety of reasons. One is essentially a re-statement  of the traditional "bicycle" view
of the GATT: it must keep moving forward  to stay upright. 36 Another is their dislike of the currently
fashionable sectoral approach. Regional moves towards  free trade encourage  them to press for
multilateral liberalization:  Hong Kong is worried that the relevance and authority of the WTO system
will be diminished unless it keeps pace with regional developments; Mexico, as a participant already
in NAFTA and in free-trade agreements  with other Latin American countries,  feels that it can easily
take on similar commitments in the WTO. They tend to favour a broad and ambitious agenda for
negotiations  because they have a comparatively  wide range of national trade interests, which they
believe will be best served in the context of a single undertaking that offers something  for all
participants, and allows trade-offs.
34  Statement by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso,  Geneva, 19 May 1998
35  Statement to the WTO General Council  by India, 10 December 1997 (WT/GC(97)/ST/10).
36 Statement to the WTO General Council  by Argentina, 10 December 1997:  "It is necessary  to
maintain the momentum  in the general trend towards the liberalization  of intemational trade and to
avoid the growing pressures we are seeing on the part of some of the major trading powers that seek to
slow down this trend." (WT/GC(97)/  ST/3).52
A deep division persists, as during the Uruguay  Round and its predecessor  the Tokyo Round of the
1970s, as to whether developing countries  should as a matter  of principle insist on receiving special
and differential treatment in the conduct and results of multilateral trade negotiations. India, Egypt,
Pakistan, most African countries and other least-developed  countries  continue to argue that "S&D"
treatment is justified by the needs of developing  countries, and should  be pursued and granted
wherever practicable. Some other developing countries  continue to pay lip service  to this view.
Higher-income  developing countries  in Asia and Latin America now mostly  think it mistaken, both as
a matter of ecDnomic  policy and as a negotiating  technique. In the Tokyo  Round, insistence  by almost
all developing  countries on S&D, and consequent  refusal to accept new GATT obligations or to offer
reciprocal  trade concessions  to developed  countries, largely reduced  them to the role of impotent
bystanders. Developed countries  negotiated  among themselves,  taking the view that those who would
give nothing need be offered nothing. The outcome  was that although the reticence of developing
countries prevented changes in the GATT  rules (instead, a number of "codes" on dumping, subsidies
and other matters were accepted  by a limited number  of countries), it could not prevent market access
negotiations which inevitably  yielded liberalization  mainly in trade sectors of interest to developed
countries. In the Uruguay  Round, developing  countries  took a much fuller part in the negotiations,
and although some maintained the rhetoric of S&D,  this was scarcely  reflected  in the results. The
Tokyo Round experience is relevant in gauging the extent to which developing countries opposed  to
new negotiations  would  be able to block them. Determined opposition could prevent negotiation of
new WTO rules applicable  to all member  countries, and could block changes even  to those existing
rules that will be reviewed  under the "built-in agenda". It could not, however,  prevent market-
opening negotiations among interested countries,  provided  the results were applied on an MFN  basis.
It might also encourage  negotiation of new limited-membership  codes,  for instance on investment,
which at least some developing countries  could be expected  to join.
With such a ranige  of disparate views and concerns, developing  countries are in no position to speak
with a single voice in the WTO. Meetings of the Informal Group  of Developing  Countries, a body
carried over from the GATT, provide regular opportunities  to brief one another and exchange  views
on developmen1s,  but no more. Beyond this, some developing-country  delegates are seeking  to build
ad hoc coalitions of countries  with a shared interest in particular issues, with the aim of presenting a
common front in whatever  forum may be relevant. One such grouping has been involved in the work
on labour standards in the ILO;  others are understood to have discussed agricultural issues,
competition,  dispute settlement,  possibilities  of special and differential treatment for developing
countries, and the concept of a new WTO  round. A particular effort is being made to identify
"positive issues"' -- i.e., those on which negotiations  in the WTO might yield clear gains for
developing  countries. To the extent that these efforts succeed, developing countries  will be better
placed to participate in defining the content of any future round of negotiations, rather than (as so
often at present) simply reacting to initiatives from the major developed  WTO members. Such
coalitions could also play a part in the negotiations  themselves. Experience in the Uruguay Round53
was that some of the most influential proposals came from small groups of countries,  both developed
and developing, who had identified a promising approach  and worked on it together before  presenting
their ideas to other participants.
At present, however,  textiles and clothing is the sole WTO  issue on which developing  countries are
sufficiently  united to express their views through a single spokesman and jointly-submitted
documentation.  Developing  countries  account for a majority of the Cairns Group, which in spite of
divergent interests at the level of some individual  commodities  has made effective  common  cause for
agricultural liberalization  and reform. Also in the area of agriculture, the net food importers
succeeded  in making their position known in the Uruguay  Round, to some effect, and will presumably
do so again in the coming agricultural negotiations. Otherwise,  the expectation is that groupings of
developing countries for the purposes of negotiation  will be regionally  based. The ASEAN countries
have worked closely  together in the WTO and the GATT, and frequently use a single spokesman. As
a customs  union, Mercosur is expected  to negotiate as a unit: this will require its members to work out
a common position on every issue, but will also increase its influence. There is speculation  that the
Southern African countries  might coordinate  their views, and thereby make their collective  voice
heard.
More than one developing-country  representative  suggests  that any new round of negotiations in the
WTO would be more acceptable  if built "from the bottom up", rather than "top down". Even those
who believe that linkages between issues are inevitable,  and probably  helpful, would prefer that a
negotiating package emerge gradually and naturally, rather than through a political initiative such as
launched the Uruguay Round. They  recognize, however,  that the major developed  countries may need
such an initiative to launch a new round at all. On this point, as on others, developing countries
acknowledge,  in the words of one prominent delegate,  that "we shall have to see how the Europeans
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